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Several recent studies have shown that plaintiffs bringing employment
discrimination lawsuits in federal court under Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) win only approximately five percent of their cases.
This Article argues that this phenomenon is attributable, at least in part, to
the ADA’s flawed definition of the term “disability.” It suggests abandoning
the current definition and adopting a new approach, one that would reshape
the ADA’s protected class so that it more closely resembles a discrete and insular
minority, such as those traditionally protected by the civil rights laws. While
Title I of the ADA embraces the goals of participatory and distributive justice
for all individuals with disabilities, these objectives should be subordinated to
the goal of providing corrective justice for those who commonly suffer
discrimination. “Individuals with disabilities” should be redefined to mean
those with mental or physical impairments that have been targeted for
systematic discrimination by public policy or widespread private practice. The
ADA should further authorize the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) to develop an exclusive list of covered impairments and
categories of conditions that are known to be associated with discrimination,
such as mental illness, disfigurement, and paralysis. The proposed definition
and the list of covered categories would provide much clearer guidance to
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plaintiffs, employers, and the courts, and would significantly enhance the
efficacy of Title I of the ADA.
INTRODUCTION
In 2001, the American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Commission on
Mental and Physical Disability Law published a study on Title I of the
1
Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits employment
2
discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities. The
study revealed that employers prevailed in 95.7% of the final Title I
case decisions—meaning cases that have gone through the appeals
3
process, if any, or were not yet changed on appeal as of April 2002.
Professor Ruth Colker published a similar study in 1999 concluding
that defendants prevailed in 94% of cases at the federal district court
level and in 84% of cases in which losing plaintiffs appealed their
4
judgments.
Another scholar, Louis S. Rulli, published a study of all reported
ADA cases litigated in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania during
5
1996, 1997, and 1998. Much like the other researchers, Rulli found
that employers prevailed in 94.2% of Title I cases, experiencing their
6
highest win rate in 1998. He noted that “[p]laintiffs stumbled most
often by not being able to satisfy the definition of disability, despite
7
clearly possessing physical or mental impairments.”

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000).
2. Id. § 12112(a).
3. Amy L. Allbright, 2001 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I—Survey
Update, 26 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 394, 394-98 (2002). Prior ABA
surveys, conducted for the years 1992-2000, revealed similarly high employer win
rates. Id. According to the ABA, in the years 1992 through 1997, plaintiffs lost
91.6% of the 1,200 cases litigated. See id. at 397 (excluding from the database lower
court decisions that were overruled on appeal). Likewise, employee-plaintiffs lost
94.4%, 95.7% and 96.4% of cases in 1998, 1999, and 2000, respectively. Id.
4. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 108 (1999) [hereinafter Colker, A Windfall for Defendants].
In a subsequent study, Colker analyzed appellate cases in greater detail to determine
which factors might predict ADA appellate outcomes. Ruth Colker, Winning and
Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 244-78 (2001)
[hereinafter Colker, Winning and Losing] (examining a database of 720 published
and unpublished cases available on Westlaw and finding that employers obtained full
reversal in 42% of the cases they appealed and had damages reduced in an
additional 17.5% of cases, while plaintiffs who appealed pro-employer judgments
obtained reversals in only 12% of cases).
5. Louis S. Rulli, Employment Discrimination Litigation Under the ADA from the
Perspective of the Poor: Can the Promise of Title I be Fulfilled for Low-Income Workers in the
Next Decade?, 9 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 345, 365-66 (2000).
6. Id. at 366. The author notes that defendants were slightly less successful in
Title II and Title III cases, prevailing in 91.7% and 85.7% of cases, respectively. Id. at
n.149.
7. Id.
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By contrast, Professor Colker found that plaintiffs litigating cases
8
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) obtained
reversals in 34% of the cases they appealed, a much higher rate than
9
the 12% pro-plaintiff reversal rate under the ADA. A study of sexual
harassment cases concluded that plaintiffs won 54.1% of cases
decided on pretrial motions, 45.7% of bench trials, and 54.6% of jury
10
trials. At the appellate level, both plaintiffs and defendants who
11
appealed won 27% of the cases. A study of Age Discrimination in
12
litigation revealed that overall,
Employment Act (“ADEA”)
defendants won only 25.8% of cases and plaintiffs prevailed in 8.7%
of cases, while approximately 58% of cases were resolved through
13
settlement. Thus, ADEA plaintiffs obtained favorable decisions in
14
over 20% of cases that did not settle.
In a well-known article entitled The Selection of Disputes for
15
Litigation, George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein argue that cases
which are fully litigated rather than resolved through settlement are
16
commonly close cases that are difficult to decide. They explain that
“[w]here either the plaintiff or defendant has a ‘powerful’ case,
settlement is more likely because the parties are less likely to disagree
17
about the outcome.” Because most adjudicated disputes are close
18
cases, the plaintiff win rate in court should approach fifty percent.

8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000) (prohibiting employment
discrimination based on race, color, national origin, religion, and gender).
9. Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 4, at 248 & 253.
10. Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 548, 570 (2001).
11. Id. at 574.
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1999).
13. George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The Expanding Scope of Employment
Discrimination Law, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 513 (1995).
14. Rutherglen, supra note 13, at 513. See also Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J.
Schwab, Double Standard on Appeal: An Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination
Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (July 16, 2001) available at
http://www.naacpfstf.org/double-standard.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2003). The study
finds that with respect to employment discrimination cases litigated in federal court,
defendants win 43.61% of cases they appeal after a plaintiff’s trial victory and 44.74%
of cases they appeal after a plaintiff’s pretrial victory. Id. Plaintiffs win only 5.8% of
cases they appeal after a defendant’s trial victory and 11.03% of cases they appeal
when a defendant has obtained a pretrial victory. Id. The study does not provide a
more specific analysis relating to different categories of claims, such as race, age, and
disability.
15. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
16. Id. at 17.
17. Id.
18. See id. (describing the statistical reasoning for why plaintiffs’ win rate should
approach fifty percent).
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In light of this theory, the ADA plaintiffs’ success rate of only five
19
percent is all the more startling.
This Article provides an assessment of the efficacy of Title I of the
ADA, with particular focus on the statute’s definition of “disability.”
It poses several fundamental questions. First, what are the statutory
goals of the law? Second, are the very low plaintiff win rates indicative
of any flaw in the ADA that requires its revision? Finally, what
alternatives exist for revising the ADA and which are the most
reasonable options?
With these fundamental questions in mind, one should consider
the ADA’s statutory goals.
The statute purports to promote
20
participatory justice by requiring that society reshape practices that
21
exclude individuals with disabilities. It also purports to promote
22
distributive justice by mandating a redistribution of resources in the
form of reasonable accommodation to facilitate job performance for
23
individuals with disabilities. These two goals, however, should be
subordinated to a related, but distinct objective: corrective justice.
19. Allbright, supra note 3, at 394.
20. See Elizabeth Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality, 109 ETHICS 287, 312
(1999) (arguing that all competent adults have equal abilities to act as moral agents
in society); Anita Silvers, Reconciling Equality to Difference: Caring (F)or Justice for People
with Disabilities, 10 HYPATIA 30, 47-53 (1995) (hypothesizing that exclusion of disabled
persons is a result of lack of social and political power rather than any natural
inferiority); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 173 (1990)
(defining social equality as requiring the “full participation and inclusion of
everyone in a society’s major institutions”).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000) (stating that “[t]he Nation’s proper goals
regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self sufficiency for such
individuals”).
22. See Richard J. Arneson, Disability, Discrimination, and Priority, in AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES 18, 25-27 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000)
(describing the responsibility-catering, welfarist, and prioritarian conceptions of
distributive justice); see also Dan Brock, Health Care Resource Prioritization and
Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 223, 23234 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000) [hereinafter Brock, Health
Care] (discussing prioritization of resource allocation to those who are worst off);
Dan Brock, Justice and the ADA: Does Prioritizing and Rationing Health Care Discriminate
Against the Disabled? 12 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 159, 159-60 (1995) [hereinafter Brock,
Justice and the ADA] (stating that a theory of justice’s conclusions regarding the
distribution of benefits and burdens are dependant on the principles applied to
them); Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in EQUAL FREEDOM: SELECTED TANNER
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 307, 327-29 (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995) (arguing that
resources should be devoted to the disabled based on a concept of “basic capability
equality”); David Wasserman, Distributive Justice, in ANITA SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY,
DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 147, 147 (1998) [hereinafter DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION] (noting
that disabled individuals receive goods and services on the basis of their disability as a
result of legislative entitlements and civil rights in the United States).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (establishing that unlawfully
discriminatory practices include failure to provide reasonable accommodations to
otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities).
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Title I of the ADA should be viewed primarily as combating existing
discrimination against people with disabilities and providing redress
for those who suffer systematic discrimination because of their
24
physical or mental impairments.
This Article argues that the definition of the term “disability” is
25
severely flawed and hinders the achievement of corrective justice.
The definition provides little guidance to litigants and to the courts
concerning who can be deemed an individual with a disability and
obligates courts to engage in the burdensome task of individually
26
assessing each plaintiff’s functionality level. This process leads to
inconsistent court decisions concerning which conditions constitute
disabilities, to personal and invasive questions by fact-finders
regarding plaintiffs’ daily life activities, and to an ever-narrowing
27
judicial interpretation of the scope of the protected class. Unlike
28
the groups protected by other civil rights statutes, individuals with
disabilities, as currently defined, do not constitute a “discrete and
insular minority” and are not easily identifiable as a class.
Moreover, the ADA’s amorphous definition of disability is costly to
both private litigants and to the public. Plaintiffs are misled into
filing marginal suits with little or no chance of actual success in court;
employers must absorb the expense of defending a multitude of cases
brought by those with questionable disability status; and the public
must support the administrative and court costs of processing such
litigation.
To provide better guidance to plaintiffs, employers, and the courts,
the ADA’s protected class should be reshaped so that it is more easily
discernable and more like other classes that have gained civil rights
protection because of their histories of exclusion and
29
marginalization. This Article proposes a new categorical system for
redefining the ADA’s protected class and bolstering the law’s
30
efficacy. It suggests that “individuals with disabilities” be redefined
as those with mental or physical impairments that have been targeted
24. See discussion infra Part I.A.
25. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000) (defining a disability as “a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual”).
27. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
28. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(2000) (protecting persons from discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex and national origin); The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1999) (protecting persons from discrimination on the basis of
age).
29. See discussion infra Part III.
30. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
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for systematic discrimination by public policy or widespread private
31
practice. The ADA should further authorize the EEOC to develop a
list of impairments and categories of conditions that are known to
have been associated with discrimination, such as mental illness,
32
disfigurement, and paralysis. The list, which would appear in the
federal regulations, would be periodically reviewed and updated, and
those whose conditions meet the listed criteria would be presumed
33
disabled.
Part I of this Article analyzes the ADA’s statutory goals and its
current definition of the term “disability.” In addition to discussing
the statutory text, it describes the EEOC’s interpretive guidelines and
relevant court decisions and identifies several serious concerns raised
by the statutory language and mandate. Part II provides an
assessment of empirical and other evidence concerning the efficacy
of the ADA. Part III evaluates a number of alternatives that could
address
the
law’s
shortcomings
and
develops
specific
34
recommendations for revisions of the ADA’s definition of disability.
I.

TITLE I OF THE ADA: ITS GOALS AND ITS PROTECTED CLASS

A. The Statutory Goals: Participatory Justice, Distributive Justice,
and Corrective Justice
Several theorists focus on disability rights, and the ADA reflects
their philosophies. Elizabeth Anderson, Anita Silvers, and Iris
Marion Young argue that justice requires social inclusion and respect
35
for all persons, regardless of their physical or mental limitations.
They also propose that to treat individuals with disabilities equally,
36
society must reshape practices that are exclusionary.
31. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
32. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
33. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
34. Throughout this Article, the terms “individual with a disability” and
“disabled” are used interchangeably because no consensus exists as to which is more
appropriate.
British activists, for instance, use the term “disabled people,”
emphasizing that these individuals are above all else people and are disabled only
because society views them as such and subjects them to marginalization. American
activists prefer the term “people with disabilities,” emphasizing that a disability does
not change the inner person and that it constitutes only one characteristic, among
many, of a person. See Arneson, supra note 22, at 9-10. Activists in both countries
find the term “the disabled” troubling because it suggests that individuals with very
different characteristics can be lumped together as an inferior class and thereby
stereotyped. Id.
35. Anderson, supra note 20, at 312; DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION,
supra note 22, at 47-53; YOUNG, supra note 20, at 173.
36. Anita Silvers, People with Disabilities, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL
ETHICS 300, 311-12 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2003).
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Silvers offers one mechanism for applying the participatory justice
theory to policy decisions. Silvers proposes that specific social
practices be assessed using a test referred to as “historically
37
counterfactualizing.” This test “involves asking whether a practice
would be the same if the disabled individuals it marginalizes were the
38
If the answer is
majority, not a powerless minority, of people.”
39
negative, the practice should be changed.
To illustrate, if the
majority of Americans were in wheelchairs, most buildings would
have been built with ramps and elevators long before the ADA
required these practices.
The ADA embraces participatory justice as one of its explicit goals.
The statute’s “Findings and Purposes” section states that “[t]he
Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to
assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living,
40
and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals.”
Accordingly,
the statute mandates that employers may not exclude qualified
individuals with disabilities from the workplace because of their
41
disabilities.
Other theorists contend that equality of social opportunities is a
tangential issue, and that justice requires primarily a redistribution of
goods so that the disabled receive additional resources to compensate
42
for their limitations.
Amartya Sen, for example, emphasizes the
need for “basic capability equality” and believes that distributive
justice requires allocating enough resources to those with limitations
43
so that they can achieve essential abilities. Richard Arneson believes
that prioritization of resources should depend on two factors:
37. Id. at 312.
38. Id. at 312-13.
39. Id. Professor Silvers further elucidates her argument as follows:
Historical counterfactualizing helps us to identify disadvantage that is the
arbitrary artifact of social arrangements controlled by the standard of
normality. It facilitates distinguishing arrangements that do no more than
conform to the dominant group’s tastes and preferences from arrangements
that have more to recommend them. Tastes and preferences are transitory.
The practices they elicit need not be perpetual. Exclusionary practices
dominate . . . because most often they are comfortable for the majority and
disadvantage only a minority of people. Although the majority may be
discomforted if restrictive practices are altered to become more inclusive,
their social participation is not threatened by such change. Thus, on
balance, such social reform is less burdensome for members of the majority
than enduring exclusion is for members of the minority.
Id. at 313.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000).
41. See id. § 12112(a).
42. See, e.g., Arneson, supra note 22, at 25-27; Brock, Justice and the ADA, supra note
22, at 159-60; Brock, Health Care, supra note 22, at 232-34; Sen, supra note 22, at 32729; DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION, supra note 22, at 147.
43. Sen, supra note 22, at 328.
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(1) how badly off each person would be compared to others if no
further resources were allocated to her; and (2) how much
individuals will benefit from further allocations, as compared to
44
others who might receive them.
The ADA likewise embraces the objective of distributive justice. It
speaks of enabling individuals with disabilities to achieve
45
“independent living” and “economic self-sufficiency.” The law also
requires employers to absorb the cost of providing reasonable
accommodations to qualified individuals with disabilities for purposes
46
of facilitating job performance.
This Article argues for emphasis of a related but distinct goal:
corrective justice. Title I of the ADA should be viewed primarily as
combating existing discrimination against people with particular
impairments and providing redress for those who suffer systematic
47
The emphasis,
discrimination because of their disabilities.
therefore, is not upon providing opportunities for anyone with
physical or mental limitations, but upon counteracting known
patterns of discrimination.
This objective, too, correlates with the language of the ADA, which
describes individuals with disabilities as “a discrete and insular
minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations,
subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated
48
to a position of political powerlessness in our society.” The goal of
corrective justice provides a clearer conception of the ADA’s purpose
than the other two above-mentioned goals and answers the question
of who should benefit from the promotion of participatory and
distributive justice. Those individuals with limitations that are
generally targeted for discrimination and exclusion are the most
needy and deserving and, according to the ADA’s text, are also the
49
intended statutory beneficiaries. Corrective justice is at the root of
the other federal anti-discrimination statutes as well, as they are
designed to provide remedies for those who have long suffered

44. Arneson, supra note 22, at 26.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000).
46. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Arguably, it is unfair to place this burden on
employers because they are not responsible for causing disabilities. Business
advocates would likely contend that a better way to meet the goal of distributive
justice is to place the burden on society at large through taxation and social
programs.
47. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000).
49. Id. § 12101(a)(7), (b).
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discrimination because of their race, color, national origin, religion,
50
sex, and age.
The goal of corrective justice is inherent in the civil rights model in
general and the ADA in particular. Unfortunately, the statutory
definition of the term “disability” does not enable the achievement of
this objective. The shortcomings of the definition are analyzed in the
following section.
B. The Definition of “Disability” Under the ADA, Federal Regulations, and
Judicial Interpretation
Title I of the ADA, which addresses employment discrimination,
prohibits employers from discriminating against qualified individuals
51
with disabilities because of their disabilities. The law also requires
that employers provide reasonable accommodations to qualified
applicants and employees unless doing so would pose an undue
52
hardship for the employer.
The ADA provides a three-part definition of the term “disability”:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of . . . [an] individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
53
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

The statute protects not only those with actual disabilities, but also
those who are not currently disabled although they have a past record
50. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000)
(prohibiting unlawful employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex
or national origin); see also The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 623 (2000) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on age); The Equal Pay
Act (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000) (prohibiting wage discrimination based on
sex); discussion infra Part III.A.3 and note 256.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). Specifically, the statute provides:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.
Id. The term “qualified individual with a disability” is defined as “an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” Id.
§ 12111(8).
52. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The provision states that unlawful discrimination
includes:
[N]ot making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business of such covered entity.
Id.
53. Id. § 12102(2).
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of a disability and those whom an employer wrongly regards as being
54
disabled. The statutory text, however, does not provide any further
details as to the meaning of the definition’s terms. Phrases such as
“physical or mental impairment,” “substantially limits,” and “major
55
life activity” remain ambiguous and open to interpretation.
54. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (articulating
the rationale for including individuals who are regarded as disabled within the
protected class in a case decided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which
prohibits disability discrimination by entities receiving federal funds). The Court
reasoned that by amending the definition of “handicapped individuals” to include
both those who are truly physically impaired and those who are incorrectly deemed
impaired, Congress recognized that society’s myths concerning disability and disease
are just as debilitating as limitations caused by actual disabilities. Id.
55. The regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) do provide further explanation of the definitional terms.
They define a “physical or mental impairment” as follows:
(1) physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary,
hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) any mental or physiological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2001). Furthermore, the regulations define the term “major
life activities” to mean “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” Id.
§ 1630.2(i) (2001).
The question of when a condition that limits only an individual’s ability to work
becomes a disability under the ADA presents difficulty. The EEOC’s regulations
explain that
(3) With respect to the major life activity of working—
The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to
perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as
compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and
abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute
a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.
Id. § 1630.2(j)(3) (2001).
The regulations further instruct that in determining whether an individual is
disabled with respect to the life activity of working, one should consider the following
factors:
(1) the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;
(2) the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills,
or abilities within that geographical area from which the individual is also
disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or
the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge,
skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is
also disqualified because of the impairment. . . .
Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) (2001).
Finally, the federal regulations explain that the “regarded as” prong of the
definition of disability is meant to protect any individual who:
Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major
life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation;
Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life
activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment;
or
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It is clear, however, that the definition of “disability” requires an
56
individualized assessment of each plaintiff’s level of functionality.
This mandate has generated a plethora of litigation, and in recent
years several cases have reached the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court’s first decision concerning the ADA’s
definition of disability was hailed as a victory for plaintiffs. In the
57
1998 case of Bragdon v. Abbott, the Supreme Court determined that
the plaintiff’s asymptomatic HIV infection rose to the level of a
disability because it substantially limited her major life activity of
58
reproducing and bearing children. The Court, however, did not
decide whether HIV constituted a disability per se, and therefore, the
decision is quite narrow, applying only to those who are biologically
able to reproduce and wish to do so but feel deterred by their HIV
59
status.
In the cases following Bragdon, the Supreme Court has been less
sympathetic to plaintiffs and has narrowed considerably the scope of
the disability definition. In Sutton v. United Air Lines, two severely
myopic twin sisters brought complaints against United Air Lines
because they were denied jobs after failing to meet the airline’s
60
minimum visual acuity requirement for uncorrected vision.
The
Supreme Court decided that measures that correct or mitigate an
impairment must be considered in determining whether a particular
61
condition is a disability. Consequently, the Court determined that
because their vision could be fully corrected with glasses or contact
62
lenses, neither sister had an eligible “disability” under the ADA.

Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (h)(1) or (2) of this
section but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting
impairment.
Id. § 1630.2(k) (2001).
It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court has stated that the EEOC was
not delegated authority to interpret the term “disability” as found in the ADA and
has rejected some of the agency’s interpretations. See Sutton v. United Airlines, 527
U.S. 471, 479, 482 (1999) (stating that no agency has been delegated the authority to
interpret “disability,” including the EEOC).
56. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998) (assessing whether the
plaintiff was substantially limited in her ability to reproduce).
57. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
58. Id. at 641.
59. Id. at 642.
60. 527 U.S. 471, 475-76 (1999).
61. Id. at 482.
62. Id. at 488-89. The Court also determined that the plaintiffs failed to prove
that they were disabled with respect to working because they were not precluded
from a broad class of jobs. Id. at 491-93. Furthermore, they failed to prove that the
employer regarded them as having a disability because the employer only considered
them unable to hold the unique position of global pilot and did not perceive them as
unable to work in any other type of job. Id.
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In a companion case, Murphy v. United Parcel Service, the Court
reiterated its conviction that for purposes of determining whether an
individual has a disability under the ADA, the condition must be
assessed in light of any available medications or mitigating
64
measures. Thus, the Court found that the petitioner, a mechanic
and driver with blood pressure exceeding Department of
Transportation requirements, did not have a disability because when
65
medicated, he functioned normally in daily activities. The Court
further found that the petitioner was not protected under the
“regarded as” prong of the definition of disability because UPS only
perceived him as unable to perform the specialized job of mechanic
with driving responsibilities, not as being generally unable to work as
66
a mechanic.
In its most recent case concerning the question of what constitutes
a disability under the ADA, the Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
67
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, found that despite suffering many
limitations arising from carpal tunnel syndrome and other
impairments, Ella Williams failed to prove that she was disabled in
68
her capacity to perform manual tasks.
Despite the fact that the
ailments prevented her from dancing, sweeping, and sometimes
dressing without assistance and limited her ability to play with her
69
children, garden, and drive long distances, the Court, per Justice
O’Connor, reasoned that because “she could still brush her teeth,
wash her face, bathe, tend her flower garden, fix breakfast, do
laundry, and pick up around the house,” she was unable to show that
her ailments caused changes in her life that severely limited her from
70
performing tasks that are essential to most people’s everyday lives.
Therefore, in applying this reasoning, the Court declared that
Williams had failed to “establish a manual-task disability as a matter of
71
law.”
The lower courts have been similarly restrictive in their
interpretation of the term “disability.” For instance, the courts have
been loath to find that plaintiffs with cancer have a disability under
63. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
64. Id. at 521.
65. Id. at 520-21.
66. Id. at 524-25. Note that in a third opinion issued the same day, Albertson’s Inc.
v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566-67 (1999), the Supreme Court held that the Ninth
Circuit erred in finding that a truck driver with amblyopia had a disability without
identifying his specific degree of visual loss.
67. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
68. Id. at 202.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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the ADA. An example may be found in Ellison v. Software Spectrum,
73
Inc. where a patient diagnosed with breast cancer was treated with
surgery and daily radiation therapy for six weeks and was able to
continue working on a modified schedule without missing any days of
74
work. After her job was eliminated, she filed suit, but the Fifth
75
Circuit found that she was not disabled. Similarly, plaintiffs with
76
77
78
diabetes, epilepsy, heart disease, and many other conditions have
experienced difficulty in convincing courts that their ailments should
qualify as disabilities, often because their conditions are controlled
79
with medication.
C. Concerns Raised by the Definition of the Term “Disability”
1.

The vagueness of the terminology
The ADA’s definition of “disability” contains vague terms such as
80
This terminology
“substantially limits” and “major life activities.”
provides little guidance to courts and litigants as to who precisely is a

72. See, e.g., Gordon v. E.L. Hamm Assoc., 100 F.3d 907 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a patient with lymphoma did not have a disability); Schwertfager v. City of
Boynton Beach, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (finding that an employee
recovering from breast cancer surgery failed to prove she had a disability); EEOC v.
R.J. Gallagher Co., 959 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that a patient with
leukemia did not have a disability), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir.
1999). For an analysis of the courts’ treatment of cancer cases, see Jane Byeff Korn,
Cancer and the ADA: Rethinking Disability, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (2001).
73. 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996).
74. Id. at 189.
75. See id. at 191 (finding that the plaintiff was not substantially limited in her
ability to work).
76. See, e.g., Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2002) (ruling that
plaintiff’s diabetes was not an actual disability because he failed to show it limited a
major life activity); Beaulieu v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 23 Fed. Appx. 811, 811-12
(9th Cir. 2001) (determining that diabetes did not substantially limit an employee in
a major life activity and thus he was not disabled under the ADA); Berg v. Norand
Corp., 169 F.3d 1140, 1145 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that Berg’s diabetes, which
limited her to forty to fifty hours of work per week, was not a disability under the
ADA).
77. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 352-53 (4th Cir. 2001)
(finding that an employee who suffered from epileptic seizures was not disabled
under the ADA); Arnold v. City of Appleton, 97 F. Supp. 2d 937, 947 (E.D. Wis.
2000) (holding that a firefighter with epilepsy failed to establish that he was disabled
because his affliction did not substantially limit a major life activity).
78. Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 805-06 (5th Cir. 1997)
(ruling that appellant did not offer evidence upon which the jury could determine
that his heart condition limited his ability to work); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over MidAmerica, 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that a man with high blood
pressure and coronary artery disease was not disabled).
79. For case summaries relating to a large number of disabilities see AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT MANUAL (BNA) § 100 (1992).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
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81

person with a disability. In a speech to business lawyers on March
14, 2002, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor explicitly
82
criticized the ADA for failing to specify the intent of Congress. She
stated that the statute exemplifies what occurs when a bill’s “sponsors
are so eager to get something passed that what passes hasn’t been as
carefully written as what a group of law professors might put
83
together.”
Textual vagueness is sometimes an unavoidable or incurable
defect. Thus, a primary duty of the courts is to interpret statutory
84
language, and they routinely do so in the course of deciding cases.
To carry out that duty, courts, at times, turn to legislative history,
utilize “canons of construction” that have been developed as
85
interpretive tools, or grapple with the plain text of the law.
Statutory language is often the product of political compromise,
86
In the process of
and therefore, is frequently imprecise.
81. For articles criticizing the ADA’s definition of “disability” see Chai Feldblum,
Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why?
And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91 (2000); Bonnie
Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court’s Definition of Disability Under the ADA: A Return to the
Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321 (2000); Cheryl L. Anderson, “Deserving Disabilities”: Why
the Definition of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act Should Be Revised to
Eliminate the Substantial Limitation Requirement, 65 MO. L. REV. 83 (2000); Lisa
Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure of the
“Disability” Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1405
(1999); Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409 (1997).
82. See Charles Lane, O’Connor Criticizes Disabilities Law as Too Vague, WASH. POST,
Mar. 15, 2002, at A2 (stating that the Act left “uncertainties as to what Congress had
in mind”).
83. Id.
84. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 35 (1997) (stating that
“[w]hatever Congress has not itself prescribed is left to be resolved by the executive
or (ultimately) the judicial branch”); see also Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of
CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken A Good Thing
Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 208 (1996) (discussing statutory construction,
and in particular, the employment of the “remedial purpose canon” and its history).
85. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 84, at 14-37 (reviewing the “science of statutory
construction,” including canons of construction); Watson, supra note 84, at 208-25
(discussing canons of construction historically and contextually); Karl Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are
to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1949-50) (stating that canons of
construction are needed tools for arguing statutory meaning and, thereafter, listing
the various canons employed by courts and attorneys).
86. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REV. 341, 350 (1949) (stating that “[e]verything that emerges from the
legislative forum is tainted by its journey through the lobby”); Feldblum, supra note
81, at 126-34 (discussing the politics of the ADA’s passage); Joseph A. Grundfest &
A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in
Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 640 (2002) (discussing how
ambiguity of statutory language may be the result of a need to compromise in order
to get legislation passed); SCALIA, supra note 84, at 34 (discussing the role of lawyerlobbyists and arguing that because of their involvement, legislative history is not an
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negotiation, various parties agree to relinquish strong language that
they had advocated in order to make the bill palatable to a sufficient
number of legislators to win its passage, but the cost of the process
may amount to the abandonment of wording that would have
87
provided greater clarity.
In other instances, terminology is left deliberately vague for
ideological reasons.
For example, Title VII, which prohibits
discrimination based on religion, among other categories, defines
“religion” as including “all aspects of religious observance and
88
practice, as well as belief.” The definition is circular, referring to
the term “religious” within its text and failing to instruct the courts
precisely as to what activity or group is protected. Courts, however,
are committed to a long tradition of being very liberal in determining
which beliefs are considered “religious” so that they will not be
placed in the position of judging the legitimacy of various belief
systems. In the words of one court deciding a Title VII case,
“[s]incere beliefs, meaningful to the believer, need not be confined
in either source or content to traditional or parochial concepts of
89
religion.”
One should note that the definition of “individual with a disability”
90
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is identical to the definition
91
later adopted by the ADA. Professor Chai Feldblum, one of the
authors of the ADA, explains the decision to incorporate the
Rehabilitation Act’s definition into the newer statute as follows:
Political advocates for people with disabilities in Washington
preferred . . . [this] approach because, as a strategic matter, it
seemed smarter to use a definition of disability that had fifteen
years of experience behind it, rather than to attempt to convince
appropriate tool for statutory interpretation).
87. Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 86, at 640.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
89. See Ali v. S.E. Neighborhood House, 519 F. Supp. 489, 490 (1981) (citing
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), and United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 165 (1965)).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2000). The Rehabilitation Act, which was enacted seventeen
years before the ADA, prohibits disability discrimination by any program or activity
receiving federal funds or being conducted by an executive agency or the U.S. Postal
Service. Id. § 794 (2000).
91. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (2002), with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)
(incorporating the same language). The Rehabilitation Act originally defined a
handicapped individual as “any individual who (A) has a physical or mental disability
which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to
employment and (B) can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of employability
from vocational rehabilitation services . . . .” Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No.
93-112, § 7(6), 87 Stat. 361 (1973). Because the definition was perceived as
problematic and excessively narrow, the law was amended in 1974 to supplement the
current language. Feldblum, supra note 81, at 102-03.
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Congress to adopt a new, untested definition. Moreover, although
there had been, as noted above, a few adverse judicial opinions
under Section 504 that had rejected coverage for plaintiffs with
some impairments, those opinions were the exception, rather than
92
the rule, in litigation under the Rehabilitation Act.

Feldblum further notes that under the Rehabilitation Act, the
courts typically understood the definition to encompass any person
with a medical condition that was not inconsequential, and thus, the
courts seldom parsed the language of the definition to critically assess
whether a person falls into the category of a “handicapped
93
individual.”
Professor Ruth Colker has confirmed this analysis. In a study of
case outcomes under the Rehabilitation Act, Colker found that
before 1994 the defendant success rates at the appellate level under
94
the statute averaged only 64.9%. Notably, since 1994, the defendant
win rates have risen to 87.5%, a figure comparable to the defendants’
95
appellate success rate under the ADA, which is 86.5%.
Colker
suggests that the change may be attributable to judicial hostility
towards ADA plaintiffs, which is spilling over to Rehabilitation Act
96
cases.
One might ask why the courts have changed their approach to the
definitional language of the term “disability.”
If they rarely
questioned plaintiffs’ disability status during the early years of the
Rehabilitation Act, why do they scrutinize it so carefully under the
ADA? The answer most likely is rooted in the fact that the ADA
97
extended the anti-discrimination mandate to private employers,
92. Feldblum, supra note 81, at 128.
93. Id. at 92. There is nothing inherent in the definition of “disability” that
requires the courts to interpret it restrictively or to engage in skeptical scrutiny of
plaintiffs’ claims concerning the extent of their disabilities. Instead, the courts could
construe the definition liberally, accepting plaintiffs’ testimony that their
impairments are substantially limiting and allowing all conditions that are not so
minor as to be trivial to be included within the statutory scope. See Feldblum, supra
note 81, at 92 (discussing judicial attitudes towards the definition of “disability”
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). As a civil rights act, the ADA is a remedial
statute, and such statutes traditionally are liberally construed. See NORMAN J. SINGER,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 3A § 74.05 (5th ed. 1992) (remarking that remedial laws
provide previously non-existent rights and remedies to individuals, and they are
generally interpreted to be broad and inclusive so that their “objectives may be
realized to the fullest extent possible.”).
94. Ruth Colker, The Death of Section 504, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 219, 224-26
(2002) [hereinafter Death of Section 504].
95. Id. at 224-25.
96. See id. at 226-27 (suggesting additionally that defense lawyers may have
improved their litigation skills and that inexperienced plaintiffs’ lawyers may have
litigated poorly).
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2000) (defining “employer” as “a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working
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whereas the Rehabilitation Act applies only to programs or activities
receiving federal funds or being conducted by an executive agency or
98
the U.S. Postal Service. Under the Rehabilitation Act, the cost of
compliance falls on the taxpayers, and thus, has a dispersed impact
that generates comparatively little opposition. By contrast, private
sector employers that bear the burden of statutory compliance seem
far more likely to hire resourceful, aggressive law firms to defend
their cases and to pursue every potential avenue of attack, including
99
each plaintiff’s status as a member of the protected class.
Textual vagueness is at times unavoidable. However, excessively
vague statutes failing to provide any certainty as to what conduct is
100
prohibited, can be declared void for vagueness.
A statute is
voidable if a person of ordinary intelligence could not determine
from its language that her conduct is prohibited, or if it does not
provide the courts and the jury with sufficient guidance as to its
101
standard of liability.
One might argue that the ADA’s failure to
more clearly delineate its protected class and to inform employers
and the courts as to whom the anti-discrimination mandate binds is a
serious flaw that leaves the law vulnerable to vagueness challenges.
2.

Individualized assessment of the plaintiff’s level of functioning
Even more problematic than the textual vagueness of the statute is
the requirement of individualized assessment and the focus on each
plaintiff’s level of functioning. The ADA instructs courts to evaluate
whether each plaintiff has “a physical or mental impairment that
102
substantially limits one or more of . . . [her] major life activities.”
Potentially, this standard could constitute a sophisticated and
sensitive approach. Judges are to review each individual’s personal
circumstances carefully and use their discretion in determining
plaintiffs’ disability status. Such inclusiveness might be particularly
appropriate because diseases manifest themselves differently in
different individuals, and the degree to which they are disabling can
vary over time. Arguably, therefore, plaintiffs should not be excluded
day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year
and any agent of such person”).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1999).
99. See Feldblum, supra note 81, at 140 (referring to the “sophisticated
management bar trained in seminars to carefully parse the statutory text of the
definition”).
100. SINGER, supra note 93, at 1A § 32A:4.
101. Id.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) (defining “disability” as an actual “physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits” a “major life” activity or “a record of
such impairment” or “being regarded as having such an impairment”).
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from ADA protection based on rigid disease categories. In reality,
however, the individualized assessment mandate makes the ADA’s
definition of disability unworkable, and therefore, must be
abandoned.
First, the requirement of individualized assessment leads to
inconsistent and unpredictable court decisions. One court assessing
a plaintiff with a particular condition might find that the individual
has a disability, while a second court assessing someone with the very
same condition or a slight variation thereof could find that the
person is not substantially limited with respect to a major life activity,
103
and therefore, not entitled to statutory protection. In the words of
one of the statute’s authors, “the idea that an individualized
assessment would be used to determine whether one person with
epilepsy would be covered under the law, while another person with
epilepsy would not, was completely foreign . . . to the spirit of the
ADA as envisioned by its advocates,” but this approach has been
104
“cemented . . . in the courts.”
Such divergent findings seem
fundamentally unfair. They also make it difficult for parties to
evaluate the strengths of their cases for purposes of litigation and
settlement and for courts to find reliable precedent.
Second, the emphasis on individualized assessment and
functionality levels leads the courts to examine the daily, private
activities of plaintiffs in invasive and even humiliating ways. In
Williams, the Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiff because it
found that “she could still brush her teeth, wash her face, bathe, tend
her flower garden, fix breakfast, do laundry, and pick up around the
105
house.”
Another plaintiff had to convince the court that her HIV
substantially limited her ability to have sexual relations and to
106
procreate, and yet another was required to describe in detail how
107
Sadly, in
her colitis affected her digestive and voiding functions.
order to prevail in Title I cases, plaintiffs at times must compromise
108
their privacy and dignity.

103. See Feldblum, supra note 81, at 152 (noting the varied results that
individualized assessments yield).
104. Id.
105. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 202 (2002).
106. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 640-41 (1998).
107. Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1998).
108. See Paula E. Berg, Ill/legal: Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category
of Disability in Anti-discrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 37-39 (1999) (noting
that “[w]ithin the structure of disability determinations, the plaintiff’s body is an
object to be investigated by lawyers, doctors, and vocational experts, and ultimately
codified by a judge”).
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Most problematic, perhaps, is the fact that the focus on
functionality levels creates a “Catch-22” for plaintiffs. If an individual
has a condition that is controlled by medication or is not extremely
severe, the individual is unlikely to be deemed to have a disability
109
under the courts’ contemporary interpretations.
Yet, if a person
has a severe condition that is impervious to medication, she may not
110
be considered “qualified” for the job.
Thus, the window of
opportunity for a plaintiff to be both disabled and qualified is quite
111
narrow.
112
Additionally, the “regarded as” prong of the definition does not
meaningfully broaden the scope of the protected class. To prevail
under the “regarded as” standard, a plaintiff must prove that the
employer wrongly regarded her as having an actual disability, that is,
113
an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. While it
is very difficult to prove that a condition truly constitutes a disability
under the ADA, it is even more difficult to prove that a decisionmaker considered a condition to be a disability in his own mind. This
requires hypothesizing about the inner thoughts of another person,
and the employer can easily claim that it considered the plaintiff’s
condition to be an impairment that was not severe enough to rise to
114
the level of a disability, thus avoiding ADA liability.
3.

Cost concerns
Unlike other federal anti-discrimination laws, the ADA imposes
potentially significant direct costs upon employers. Uncertainty
concerning the scope or identity of the protected class that is to
benefit from these expenditures is thus particularly disconcerting to
courts and to employers.

109. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999)
(holding that when a person’s impairment, physical or mental, is corrected by
medication, that person “does not have an impairment that presently ‘substantially
limits’ a major life activity”).
110. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8) & 12112(a) (2000) (defining “qualified individual
with a disability” and prohibiting discrimination only against those who are
“qualified”).
111. See Feldblum, supra note 81, at 145-46 (explaining that it is difficult to argue
that an individual’s disability limits his “ability to perform a range of jobs,” but the
individual “is nonetheless fully qualified for the position”).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (2000).
113. Id. § 12102(2)(A), (C).
114. See Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities,
Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271,
276 (2000) (explaining how the EEOC’s and the court’s interpretation of the
“regarded as disabled” prong effectively insulates employers from liability under that
provision).
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Title VII, the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), and the ADEA prohibit
discrimination based on race, national origin, gender, religion, and
age on the theory that members of minority groups can perform
work as well as non-minority employees, and therefore, should be
118
given equal opportunities in the workplace.
These statutes,
consequently, target largely irrational employer conduct that is based
on unfounded assumptions and prejudice, and they do not generally
119
impose direct, out-of-pocket costs on employers.
The ADA similarly addresses irrational employer behavior in that it
prohibits discrimination against qualified employees with disabilities
120
because of their disabilities.
For example, employers cannot
decline to hire competent paralyzed individuals simply because they
do not like having wheelchairs in the workplace. Those with
disabilities who can be productive workers cannot be excluded
because of baseless fears concerning their possible limitations.
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1998).
117. Id. §§ 621-634 (1999).
118. See Nancy R. Mudrick, Employment Discrimination Laws for Disability: Utilization
and Outcome, 549 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 53, 55 (1997)
(explaining that civil rights law is based on the notion that sex, national origin,
religion, color, and race do not make people intrinsically different). The statutes, in
fact, provide employers with defenses to insure that they are not required to
compromise standards to achieve compliance. For example, Title VII and the ADEA
allow employers to discriminate against individuals based on religion, sex, national
origin, or age, when membership in a particular religion, sex, national group, or age
group is “a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1)
(2000); 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1999). The Equal Pay Act allows employers to pay
men and women doing the same job different salaries in order to maintain a
seniority system, a merit system, or a system that determines earnings by “quantity or
quality of production.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1998).
119. One clear exception is Title VII’s mandate that employers reasonably
accommodate employees’ religious beliefs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000). The
Supreme Court, however, has determined that employers have only a de minimis duty
to accommodate workers’ religious needs, and they are not required to absorb
significant costs. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977)
(stating that “[t]o require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give
Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship”). The ADA’s legislative history states
that Congress rejected the minimal Hardison standard for ADA accommodations. See
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 1, at 68 (1998) (explaining that the principles outlined in
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison do not apply to the ADA legislation); see also 29
C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (2001) (explaining that the undue hardship defense embodied
in the ADA and in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires employers to
demonstrate that accommodations would impose significantly greater expense or
burden than needed to meet the de minimis standard employed by Title VII). But see
Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, Discussion Paper No. 344, 35
(2001), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/ (last
modified Mar. 27, 2002) (arguing that the other civil rights statutes generate costs
for employers as well, for example, in the form of loss of customers who do not wish
to do business with minority employees).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
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The statute, however, goes further and requires employers to
absorb the costs of providing reasonable accommodations to
qualified individuals whose disabilities might in fact adversely affect
121
job performance. These costs can include not only the expense of
providing assistive devices or other accommodations, but also
diminished productivity, attendance problems, and increased health
122
insurance and workers’ compensation insurance costs.
Further, the ADA imposes costs unevenly upon the business
123
Some employers have multiple applicants and
community.
124
employees with disabilities, while others have none.
How
burdensome ADA compliance will be for any given employer thus
depends entirely on the makeup of the employer’s applicant and
employee populations.
The reasonable accommodation requirement addresses the need
for distributive justice. However, justice cannot be promoted if
policy-makers do not have a clear vision of the category of people
who should constitute the beneficiaries of the law and receive societal
resources. Additionally, the lack of a well-defined protected class
hinders the ability of employers to plan for necessary expenditures.
It is in this regard that the concept of corrective justice can be
enlightening, because it requires the identification of the specific
125
minority group that is to benefit from governmental intervention.

121. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 480-94 (1992) (attributing a variety of
costs to the ADA, including business loss because of customer preference for
associating with non-disabled persons, reasonable accommodation, and
administrative expenses for state enforcement of the law). While employers also
bear the burden of accommodating employees’ religious beliefs under Title VII, this
duty is minimal. See supra note 119 (discussing religion and the de minimis duty of
accommodation).
122. See Christopher J. Willis, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Disabling the
Disabled, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 715, 725-28 (1994-95) (detailing the financial burden that
ADA compliance imposes on employers).
123. See discussion infra Part III.B.3 (surveying the costs of accommodation to
businesses). Accommodation costs are also unevenly distributed within society
because only employers bear the burden of compliance under Title I of the ADA,
even though they generally are not responsible for causing disability. See id.
Arguably, it is society at large that should bear this burden through taxation and
social service programs. See id.
124. See Arneson, supra note 22, at 29 (noting that the ADA is problematic in that
it allocates the burden of assisting disabled job applicants to employers and
ultimately shifts it to consumers who pay higher prices to finance the cost of
accommodations).
125. See supra Part I.A (discussing the concept of corrective justice and its
application to the ADA); see also infra Part III.A.
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D. The ADA Deviates from the Traditional Civil Rights Model of Protecting
a Discrete and Insular Minority
The civil rights tradition advances the protection of “discrete and
insular minorities,” a term first coined in the 1938 Supreme Court
126
case, United States v. Carolene Products Co. In a footnote, Justice Story
speculated about “whether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
127
searching judicial inquiry.”
This language initiated the idea of
128
Traditionally,
heightened scrutiny for some minority groups.
courts consider several factors in determining whether a group
constitutes a discrete and insular minority deserving the benefit of
heightened scrutiny. These factors include:
Whether the group’s defining characteristic is immutable; whether
the group has suffered a history of discrimination; whether the
group is in a position of political powerlessness; whether the
group’s defining characteristic relates in any way to the individual’s
ability to participate in, and contribute to, society; and whether the
characteristic is beyond the control of the individual group
129
member.

This approach is consistent with the scholar Louis Wirth’s
definition of a minority. Wirth defines “minority” as a “group of
people who because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are
singled out from the others in the society in which they live for
differential and unequal treatment and who therefore regard
130
themselves as objects of collective discrimination.”
In its introductory “Findings and Purposes” section, the ADA
explicitly asserts that it is protecting a “discrete and insular
131
minority.” It also affirms that individuals with disabilities have all of
the qualities that characterize a discrete and insular minority, as

126. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
127. Id. at 153 n.4. For a discussion of the footnote, see generally Louis Lusky,
Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1982).
128. See Kyle C. Velte, Paths to Protection: A Comparison of Federal Protection Based on
Disability and Sexual Orientation, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 323, 359 (2000)
(discussing the concept of a “discreet and insular minority”).
129. Id. at 326-27 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,
441-44 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686
(1973); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
130. Louis Wirth, The Problem of Minority Groups, in THE SCIENCE OF MAN IN THE
WORLD CRISIS 347, 347 (Ralph Linton ed., 1945).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000).
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described above.
Specifically, it states that those with disabilities
“have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position
of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that
133
are beyond the control of such individuals.”
The “Findings and
Purposes” section, in fact, opens with a specific estimate of the
number of individuals included in the category of individuals with
134
disabilities: forty-three million.
In truth, however, the concept of a discrete and insular minority
135
remains elusive.
No “discrete and insular minority” has an
136
essentialist, universal definition. It is impossible to characterize real
human beings, with their multitude of variations, as belonging to
137
distinct categories with inflexible boundaries.
Most classifications
138
are likely to be under-inclusive, over-inclusive, or both.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. § 12101(a)(1). Chai Feldblum, one of the authors of the ADA, relates the
following concerning the forty-three million figure:
I can attest that the decision to reference 43 million Americans with
disabilities in the findings of the ADA was made by one staff person and
endorsed by three disability rights advocates, that the decision took about
ten minutes to make, and that its implications for the definition of disability
were never considered by these individuals. Moreover, it was my sense
during passage of the ADA that this finding was never considered by any
Member of Congress, either on its own merits or as it related to the
definition of disability.
Feldblum, supra note 81, at 154.
135. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1074 (1980) (contending that society cannot be
“objectively subdivided” into groups solely for the purpose of discernment and that
“people draw lines, attribute differences, as a way of ordering social existence—of
deciding who may occupy what place, play what role, engage in what activity”); see
also Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 813-14 (1999)
(observing that deciding which groups will be categorized as “discrete and insular” is
not an easy task).
136. See KATHERINE T. BARTLETT & ANGELA HARRIS, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY,
DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 1007-09 (2d ed. 1998) (pointing out that essentialism has
many problems, most of which relate to “overgeneralizations” and an attempt to
“attribute to all members of a group the characteristics of a dominant subset of that
group”).
137. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 95 (1990) (explaining that we use language to simplify the world
because we have a limited capacity to comprehend the complexity of life and stating
that “[w]e do not know how to describe individuals as unique except by reference to
traits that actually draw them into membership in groups of people sharing those
traits”). Id.; see ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 19-53
(2000); see also BARTLETT & HARRIS, supra note 136, at 1008 (noting that human
cognition involves continuously placing people into mental categories). Inevitably,
these categories are either under- or over-inclusive, and consequently, are useful only
for some purposes. Id.
138. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 86, at 352-53. The authors discuss “the
classification of American citizens of Japanese ancestry” who were subjected to
restrictions during World War II (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83
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Nevertheless, in order to provide protection or benefits to those with
particular needs, legislatures must describe and categorize the
139
intended beneficiaries.
Federal anti-discrimination laws identify “discrete and insular
minorities” through a variety of mechanisms. In the case of the
ADEA, an arbitrary age restriction of forty and above designates the
140
protected class.
In the case of sex discrimination under Title VII
and the EPA, biological characteristics determine the protected
141
With respect to race, religion, and national origin, the
class.
142
categories are arguably socially constructed.
The challenges inherent in delineating protected classes can be
illustrated by several clear examples. Women, who are traditionally
considered a minority for civil rights purposes, are not statistically a
143
minority. Similarly, race has no essentialist definition, but rather is
144
145
perceived by many as a social construct. In Plessy v. Ferguson, for
example, the Supreme Court acknowledged that whether one is
considered white or black in a given state depends on how the state

(1943)). Id. The category was under-inclusive because Americans of German or
Italian ancestry might also have felt divided loyalties, and it was over-inclusive
because it lamentably assumed that all Japanese Americans were disloyal. Id.
139. See id. at 343-44 (stating that classification establishes the group of people
who will either benefit from or be burdened by a law “which does not apply to ‘all
persons’”).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1999).
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1998) (prohibiting
sex-based discrimination).
142. See, e.g., Linda A. Lacewell & Paula Shelowitz, Beyond a Black and White Reading
of Sections 1981 and 1982: Shifting the Focus from Racial Status to Racist Acts, 41 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 823, 834-35 (1987) (discussing race as a social construct); see also Melanie
Randall, Refugee Law and State Accountability for Violence Against Women: A Comparative
Analysis of Legal Approaches to Recognizing Asylum Claims Based on Gender Persecution, 25
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 302 (2002) (citing Audrey Macklin, Refugee Women and the
Imperative of Categories, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 213, 262 (1995), and arguing against the
distinction between biological and social groups); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias
in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108
YALE L.J. 485, 495-96 (1998) (discussing controversy over whether race, sex, and
national origin are biological or socially constructed categories).
143. See Angela D. Hooton, Constitutional Review of Affirmative Action Policies for
Women of Color: A Hopeless Paradox, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 391, 419 (2000)
(questioning whether women can constitute a “suspect class” for purposes of Equal
Protection analysis given that they constitute a majority of the electorate).
144. See Lacewell & Shelowitz, supra note 142, at 834-35 (explaining that race is a
concept with social meaning rather than any taxonomic purpose); Michael Omi &
Howard Winant, Racial Formation, in RACE CRITICAL THEORIES 123, 123 (Philomena
Essed & David T. Goldberg eds., 2002) (describing race as a concept invoking
biologically based human characteristics as a means of signifying and symbolizing
social conflicts); CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE VIEW FROM AFAR 3-6 (Univ. of Chicago
Press 1992) (rejecting biological theories of race in favor of an anthropological
approach to cultural constructions of racial diversity).
145. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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in question has chosen to define racial status.
Thus, a person of
mixed blood could be considered white in one state and black in
147
another. The definition of “religion” is similarly ambiguous, since
the judiciary has broadly defined it to include any body of “[s]incere
beliefs, meaningful to the believer, [and it] need not be confined in
either source or content to traditional or parochial concepts of
148
religion.”
The problem of discerning a “discrete and insular minority” is
particularly acute in the case of individuals with disabilities. Not only
is it unclear what constitutes a “discrete and insular minority,” it is
also unclear who, in particular, has a disability. When one claims
discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion, national origin,
or age, little proof is needed to determine membership in the
asserted protected class, and little, if any, litigation revolves around
149
such questions. By contrast, in the case of the ADA, the protected
class has fluidity, and membership in it is often far from obvious.
Individuals with disabilities do not uniformly possess the qualities
that courts have come to evaluate in determining the existence of a
“discrete and insular minority.” Disabilities do not always constitute
immutable characteristics that are beyond human control. All people
possess certain mental or physical limitations. Few excel as Olympic
athletes or math geniuses. Whether or not our limitations constitute
150
disabilities remains a matter of degree.
Notably, unlike other
characteristics protected by the civil rights statutes, some disabilities
are caused by one’s own negligence or risk-taking behavior, such as
smoking or car racing. In addition, one’s disability status can change
over time. Those individuals born healthy may become disabled, and
those individuals with disabilities can improve in health and
151
functionality if they receive appropriate therapy.
Furthermore,
advances in medicine can render previously disabling conditions non146. Id. at 552 (noting “a difference of opinion” among states regarding the
determination of race).
147. Id.
148. See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that although
the Science of Creative Intelligence—Transcendental Meditation—is not a theistic
religion, it is nonetheless protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment of the Constitution); see also Ali v. S.E. Neighborhood House, 519 F.
Supp. 489, 490 (D.D.C. 1981) (citing Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970),
and United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965)).
149. See Yoshino, supra note 142, at 495 (asserting that courts agree that race, sex
and national origin are immutable characteristics).
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (requiring substantial limitation of a person’s
major life activity to constitute a disability for statutory purposes) (emphasis added).
151. See Rulli, supra note 5, at 394 (calling individuals with disabilities an “open
minority” because “almost everyone will become disabled at some point in his or her
life”).
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152

disabling. Advances in social science or popular attitudes can also
change prevailing perceptions concerning whether particular
153
Mental illness and drug addiction are
conditions are disabilities.
154
now considered disabilities,
whereas previously they were
155
considered to be the moral faults of the persons they afflicted.
Furthermore, it is impossible to assert that as a group, all those who
are substantially limited in a major life activity have been subjected to
a history of discrimination. To be sure, there is a history of
156
discrimination against people with certain disabilities. State statutes
allowed for the involuntary sterilization of the “insane, idiotic,
157
imbecile, feebleminded or epileptic.”
Some states established jury
service criteria that excluded those “afflicted with permanent disease
158
or physical weakness.” Another shocking example of discrimination
is a Chicago “ugly law” that was repealed only in 1974, providing that

152. For example, many cardiovascular problems are currently effectively
controlled by medication and are not disabling to patients.
153. See, e.g., Maggie D. Gold, Must Insurers Treat All Illnesses Equally? Mental vs.
Physical Illness: Congressional and Administrative Failure to End Limitations to and
Exclusions from Coverage for Mental Illness in Employer-Provided Health Benefits Under the
Mental Health Parity Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 767,
778-86 (1997-1998) (chronicling the development of state and federal recognition of
mental illness as a form of disability for insurance and disability law purposes).
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000) (including mental impairments in the
definition of “disability”); see also id. § 12114(b) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination
against those enrolled in drug rehabilitation programs or those who have successfully
completed such programs). However, employers may terminate or refuse to hire
individuals who are currently engaged in the use of illegal drugs. See id. § 12114(a).
155. See, e.g., Matthew Antinossi, Note, Respect for the Law Is No Excuse: Drug
Addiction History & Public Safety Officer Qualifications . . . Are Public Employers Breaking
the Law?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 711, 716-17 (1999) (pointing out that drug addiction has
been recognized as a disease for decades); Nathaniel S. Currall, Note, The Cirrhosis of
the Legal Profession—Alcoholism as an Ethical Violation or Disease Within the Profession, 12
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 739 (1989) (lauding the move away from the perception of
alcoholism as a personal failing and towards the view of alcoholism as a disease);
Karin A. Guiduli, Comment, Challenges for the Mentally Ill: The “Threat to Safety” Defense
Standard and the Use of Psychotropic Medication under Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1149, 1157 (1996) (noting the historical
association of mental illness with “sin, evil, God’s punishment, crime, and demons”).
156. See Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION 13,
13-14 (Silvers et al. eds., 1998) (describing how courts in the past barred children
with physical disabilities from schools and banned deformed individuals from public
thoroughfares).
157. E.g., Title H.R.J. Res. 299, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2002) (acknowledging
Virginia’s history of sterilizing those deemed to be “feebleminded”); see Buck v. Bell,
274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding one such law). In a now infamous passage
upholding Virginia’s sterilization law, Justice Holmes wrote that “[I]t is better for all
the world, if, instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let
them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit
from continuing their kind.” Id.
158. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-43 (1975), repealed by 1978 ALA. ACTS 594, at 712
§ 11 (1978); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 59-804 ¶ 3 (1965) (barring anyone who “is an
idiot or lunatic, or intoxicated,” without defining those terms).
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[n]o person who is diseased, maimed, mutilated or in any way
deformed so as to be an unsightly or disgusting object or improper
person to be allowed in or on the public ways or other public
places in this city, shall therein or thereon expose himself to public
view, under a penalty of not less than one dollar nor more than
159
fifty dollars for each offense.

Nevertheless, not all individuals with “disabilities,” as they are
currently defined, have been subjected to a history of discrimination,
nor are they consistently singled out for negative treatment by
160
contemporary society.
For example, people with arthritis or
cardiovascular disease, conditions that can significantly limit several
161
major life activities, are generally viewed positively. Thus, while one
of the statutory goals purports to include those subjected to societal
162
exclusion, the potential members of the protected class have not
been marginalized uniformly.
Individuals with disabilities, as currently defined, do not constitute
a discrete and insular minority, to the extent that there is any
common understanding of the term. One approach to revising the
statute is to focus on the goal of corrective justice and to reformulate
the protected class so that it more closely resembles a discrete and
insular minority. This option is explored in a later section of this
163
Article.
II. EMPIRICAL AND OTHER EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE ADA’S
EFFICACY
A careful reading of the statutory definition of the term “disability”
makes it clear that the definition is flawed, and the statute requires
revision. One might still question, however, whether empirical
evidence supports the conclusion that the ADA is failing in its mission
to provide corrective justice for deserving individuals with disabilities.
Unfortunately, only a limited body of empirical data currently exists,
164
and in some cases, it leads to no clear conclusions. Nevertheless, a

159. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 36-34 (1966) (repealed 1974). See generally
Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP.
L. REV. 393, 408-09 (1991) (noting that persons with disabilities were excluded from
hospitals, theaters, restaurants, bookstores, and auction houses for many years).
160. See Marjorie L. Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve Its Employment Goals?, 349 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 44 (1997) (observing that the intensity of prejudice
towards persons with disabilities varies according to the nature of the impairment).
161. See id. (reporting no necessary correlation between social prejudice and
severity of functional limitation).
162. See discussion supra Part I.A.
163. See discussion infra Part III.A.
164. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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number of indicators suggest that we are falling short of fulfilling the
ADA’s goals.
A. Employment Rates of Individuals with Disabilities
Several studies have compiled data concerning the employment of
individuals with disabilities since the enactment of the ADA, and the
news is not encouraging. According to one article, data from the
Current Population Survey suggested that in 1998 only 26.6% of
people with work disabilities had employment, and of these, only
165
63.9% were employed full time.
By comparison, 78.4% of
nondisabled individuals were employed, and 81.5% of those were in
166
full-time jobs.
A relatively small 2000 survey of 535 people with
disabilities and 614 without disabilities indicated that 32% of those
with disabilities (ages sixteen to sixty-four) were employed in full time
or part time jobs, compared with 81% of able-bodied people in the
167
same age group.
A study conducted by MIT economists Daron Acemoglu and
Joshua Angrist appears to show that the ADA has resulted in an
overall reduction in the rate of employment of individuals with
168
disabilities.
The authors found that on average, disabled men
between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-nine worked fewer weeks in
169
1992 through 1995 than they did before the ADA’s enactment.
Men in the age range of forty to fifty-eight also exhibited a decrease
170
in the number of weeks worked in 1992 and 1993. Acemoglu and
165. Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, Part III: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
271, 272 (2000) (citing U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (1998), available
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disable/disabcps.html (last modified Oct. 1,
2002)).
166. Id. The authors further note that the mean earnings of individuals with work
disabilities holding full-time, year-round jobs were a scant $29,513 compared to the
$37,961 earned by nondisabled individuals. See id. (attributing this disparity in part
to the fact that nearly 31% of people with work disabilities never completed high
school, while only 17.5% of nondisabled persons failed to graduate).
167. The survey was conducted by Harris Interactive and the National
Organization on Disability. Harris Interactive & the Nat’l Org. on Disability, 2000
N.O.D./Harris Survey of Americans with Disabilities, available at http://www.nod.org/
content/cfm?id=1076 (last visited Apr. 12, 2003) [hereinafter 2000 N.O.D./Harris
Survey] (finding that 29% of disabled households lived in poverty compared with
10% of nondisabled households). The survey does not necessarily indicate
improvement in employment rates for disabled people between 1998 and 2000.
Rather, the discrepancy might be due to the relatively small sample size in the
second survey.
168. DARON ACEMOGLU & JOSHUA ANGRIST, THE CASE OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6670,
1998).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 12.
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Angrist found no effect on the employment rates of disabled women
171
Women under forty,
aged forty to fifty-eight or on wage rates.
however, suffered a decrease in their levels of employment after the
172
ADA became effective.
Another researcher, Thomas DeLeire, confirmed these findings.
His research revealed that the ADA led to a 7.2% decrease in the
relative employment of individuals with disabilities, but to no change
173
in relative wages.
It is possible, therefore, that the ADA’s
reasonable accommodation requirement has created additional
incentives for employers to avoid employing individuals with
disabilities. Employers might calculate that the risk of detection of an
unlawful hiring decision appears far smaller than the risk of
employing disabled workers and incurring high accommodation
costs.
Several commentators, however, have offered explanations for
these trends that are not related to the existence of the ADA or
discrimination on the part of employers. Possible explanations are
increases in the receipt of federal disability payments, which disabled
174
individuals do not wish to relinquish for the sake of working, and
175
It is also plausible that the downward
the 1990-91 recession.
employment trend began before 1990 and continued thereafter
176
without any link to the ADA’s passage.
Another factor that might
account for the findings is the difficulty of defining the category of

171. Id.
172. Id. at 11. Schwochau and Blanck paint these findings in a more positive light.
See Schwochau & Blanck, supra note 165, at 297. The authors assert that Acemoglu
and Angrist’s results actually suggest that due to the ADA, the number of weeks
disabled women aged forty to fifty-eight worked increased relative to those worked by
nondisabled women over the 1993-96 period, once relevant employment trends at
the time of the study’s data collection are considered. Id. As for DeLeire’s findings,
Schwochau and Blanck relate that individuals with disabilities resulting from injury
have fared better since the passage of the ADA, and in particular, “disabled
minorities [have seen] an increase in their probability of employment as did those
with high school or college diplomas.” Id. In addition, they note encouraging data
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (“SIPP”), which notes a 2.9%
increase in employment among individuals with severe disabilities between the ages
of twenty-one and sixty-four from 1991-92 to 1994-95. See id. at 272 (citing this study
as evidence against a “dismal picture” of the ADA as an abject failure).
173. Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUMAN RES. 693, 704-05 (2000).
174. See Schwochau & Blanck, supra note 165, at 296 (noting that these factors
were taken into account in both the DeLeire and the Acemoglu and Angrist studies).
175. Id.; see also ACEMOGLU & ANGRIST, supra note 168, at 13; DeLeire, supra note
173, at 708-10 (rejecting these possibilities because their respective studies were
designed to account for these factors).
176. Schwochau & Blanck, supra note 165, at 303 (pointing out that DeLeire
presents a figure based on one of his models that reflects a downward trend in
employment, which apparently began before the enactment of the ADA).
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177

disabled workers. The studies discussed above relied on responses
to a question in a government survey concerning the respondent’s
178
disability status. Thus, some of those who identified themselves as
having a disability might not have one under the ADA’s definition,
whereas some of those who responded in the negative might actually
179
have a disability under the ADA.
Some disability advocates emphasize the positive psychological
effects of the ADA, a phenomenon that also tends to refute the
argument that the statute’s enactment is directly linked to a decrease
180
in employment rates among individuals with disabilities. David M.
Engel and Frank W. Munger list five ways in which the law has
impacted individuals with disabilities: (1) by changing their self181
image and allowing them to envision more accomplished careers;
(2) by changing the way others perceive them and incorporating the
182
language of ADA rights into daily-life discourse; (3) by encouraging
183
employers to implement rights voluntarily, without legal challenge;
(4) by inducing institutions to make changes consistent with the ADA
184
even if no individual requests these transformations; and (5) by
educating children and adults to feel entitled to certain rights in
185
society.
Another scholar, Bonnie Poitras Tucker, asserts that the
177. See id. at 298 (discussing the complexity and ambiguities associated with the
definition of disability).
178. E.g., DeLeire, supra note 173, at 697-98; ACEMOGLU & ANGRIST, supra note 168,
at 9; Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 280 (2000). The
question was: “Does [the individual] have a health problem or a disability which
prevents him/her from working or which limits the kind or amount of work he/she
can do?” ACEMOGLU & ANGRIST, supra note 168, at 9.
179. A more far-fetched suggestion is that the drop in employment levels, if it
exists, is ironically attributable to an enhanced sense of self-worth felt within the
disability community since the enactment of the ADA, which causes some to refuse
certain types of work. See Jolls, supra note 119, at 280 (suggesting that the drop in
employment levels might reflect an increased sense of self-worth which in turn would
induce disabled persons to invest in education rather than in the workforce and to
be more selective in the jobs they accept).
180. See generally David M. Engel & Frank W. Munger, Re-Interpreting the Effect of
Rights: Career Narratives and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 285, 329
(2001) (discussing the impact of the ADA on various disabled persons according to
the different socioeconomic and psychological conditions of those individuals).
181. See id. (arguing that the availability of rights provided by the ADA might
inspire persons with disabilities to “perceive many obstacles as the product of unfair
treatment rather than personal shortcomings”).
182. See id. (explaining that this “discourse of rights” derives from many sources,
including media coverage and what little enforcement of the Act that actually exists).
183. See id. (chronicling two instances in which accommodations were voluntarily
provided).
184. See id. (using the example of colleges providing accommodations for disabled
persons as evidence of this phenomenon).
185. See id. at 329-30, 332-33 (analogizing the impact of the ADA on the selfesteem of disabled persons to the impact of the Individuals with Disabilities Act
(“IDEA”) on the self-esteem of children in special education programs).
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ADA has led people with disabilities to feel justified in requesting
186
accommodations and to expect that their requests will be fulfilled.
Furthermore, Tucker notes that “the ADA has made society-at-large
aware of the issue of disability, and has required the public to devise
means of making society more accessible for people with disabilities
187
in the future.”
It is difficult to judge whether those actually covered by the ADA
have experienced lower rates of employment since the statute’s
188
enactment.
In light of the factors discussed above, one may fairly
say that the “attribution of disemployment results to the ADA is
189
premature.”
Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the ADA has not
resulted in the hoped-for dramatic increase in employment rates for
individuals with disabilities, and two-thirds to three-quarters of this
190
population remains outside the workforce.
B. Monetary Relief and Other Statutory Benefits
It is extremely difficult to evaluate the extent to which the ADA is
providing relief to those who actually suffer discrimination. The only
clear fact is that in the minority of cases that generate a decision on
the merits in federal court, plaintiffs have an abysmal success rate.
Little is known about the relief obtained by employees in other
forums or through other avenues.
1.

Data gaps: settlements, informal resolutions, and state court actions
It has been reported that at least 90% of all filed cases settle before
191
trial. Moreover, the overall proportion of filed-to-tried lawsuits may
192
be as low as 2%. A study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics of civil
186. See Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA’s Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil
Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 383 (2001) (asserting that this feeling of
justification is “a necessary step toward changing societal values”).
187. Id. at 384.
188. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
189. Schwochau & Blanck, supra note 165, at 303.
190. Id. at 272.
191. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REV. 4, 28 (1983) (stating that approximately 88% of the civil cases that
went to ten courts studied by the Civil Litigation Research Project terminated in an
outcome agreed upon by the parties); see also Anne Thérése Béchamps, Note, Sealed
Out-of-Court Settlements: When Does the Public Have a Right to Know?, 66 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 117, 129 (1990) (discussing the emphasis placed on encouraging settlements in
the American judicial system); Rulli, supra note 5, at 371 (discussing the importance
of settlements for the effective functioning of the judicial system).
192. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 63 (1996) (noting that the main functions of
trials is not to resolve disputes, but to deter other trials and encourage settlements,
and stating that only 2% of civil filings go to jury trial); Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy By
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rights complaints filed in United States District Courts between 1990
and 1998 revealed that in 1998, over 70% were dismissed before
judgment, of which 35.2% were settled and 12.5% were voluntarily
193
dismissed.
A study of age discrimination suits filed under the
194
195
ADEA revealed that approximately 58% of those cases settled. A
survey of 4,310 employment discrimination cases filed in the
Northern District of Illinois during the years 1972-1987 found that
80% of those cases produced no district court opinion and that 40196
60% of all filed cases were resolved through settlement.
No study
or report has focused specifically on settlements in ADA cases, and
this information is impossible to derive from publicly available
197
materials. Consequently, employees with ADA complaints may have
gained significant benefits and monetary recoveries through
198
settlements.
Another unknown is the number of disputes resolved informally
between employers and employees before litigation commences.
Employers, for example, might provide many employees with
reasonable accommodations at their request without challenging
their status as disabled and without claiming that the accommodation
199
is unduly burdensome.
Employers might often wish to avert
Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 283, 288 n.11 (1999) (noting that approximately 4% of the filed civil cases in
1990 resulted in trials); Rulli, supra note 5, at 371 (noting that recent studies indicate
that the percentage of filed-to-tried civil cases has recently fallen from 4% to 2%).
193. Marika F.X. Litras, Civil Rights Complaints in U.S. District Courts, 1990-98,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT (2000) (focusing on civil rights
complaints related to employment, housing, welfare, voting, and other civil rights
issues, excluding prisoner petitions).
194. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1999).
195. Rutherglen, supra note 13, at 513.
196. See Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A
Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 1133, 1137, 1146 (1990) (using a broad definition of “published”).
197. See Rulli, supra note 5, at 372 (stating that information concerning
settlements of suits filed under Title I of the ADA remains difficult, if not impossible,
to obtain); see also Scott Burris et al., Disputing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act:
Empirical Answers, and Some Questions, 9 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 237, 251 (2000)
(noting that statistics exist for the percentage of civil cases that settle, but no statistics
exist for cases filed under the ADA); Martha Neil, Confidential Settlements Scrutinized,
88 A.B.A. J. 20 (2002) (noting that “[c]onfidential settlements are a mainstay of civil
litigation in the United States”).
198. Professor Rulli reports that his study of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
revealed that in that district, between 47.1 and 62.6% of Title I cases settled. See
Rulli, supra note 5, at 372. Rulli further suggests that ADA cases may settle less
frequently than other types of cases for a variety of reasons, including the ADA’s
complexity, plaintiffs’ moral convictions, and defendants’ desire to create
disincentives for future litigation. Id. No comprehensive information is available
concerning ADA settlements in other regions.
199. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (establishing that the term
“discrimination” includes failure to make a reasonable accommodation for the
known limitations of an employee with a disability); see also Tucker, supra note 186, at
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litigation to save costs and avoid negative publicity or erosion of
employee morale. Employees, therefore, are likely to be frequently
benefiting from employers’ voluntary cooperation even in cases in
which the employee’s disability status is uncertain.
An additional data gap is the lack of information concerning
plaintiff success rates in state courts under the ADA and state laws
that prohibit disability discrimination. Many of the states have
adopted a definition of “disability” that is identical or very similar to
200
that found in the ADA.
In 1996 the Bureau of Justice Statistics
383 (stating that “some people and entities are voluntarily providing the
accommodations required by the ADA”).
200. State statutes that contain definitions identical to the ADA’s are:
Discrimination in Employment: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1461(2) (West 1999);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301(2.5) (2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 722(4) (1995);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.02(5A) (1999 & Supp. 2001); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-1
(Michie 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-5-6(a) (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 225C.46(1)(a) (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1002(j) (2000); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 344.010(4) (Michie 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51: 2232(11) (West 1999);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 1(17) (West 1996 & Supp. 2002); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 37.1103(d) (West 2001); MO. ANN. STAT. § 213.010(4) (West Supp.
2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(19)(a) (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102(9)
(1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.310(1) (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2001); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 354-A: 2(IV) (1995 & Supp. 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(M)
(Michie Supp. 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-3(7a) (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1402.4-02(4) (Supp. 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(13) (West 2001); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1301(4) (West 1987 & Supp. 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.100(1)
(2001); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 954 (West Supp. 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(4)
(2000 & Supp. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-1(4) (Michie 1995); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 4-21-102(9) (1998); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.002(6) (Vernon 1996 & Supp.
2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-102(5) (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495d(5)
(1987 & Supp. 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-3(M) (Michie 2002).
Some jurisdictions have adopted the ADA’s language in areas other than typical
civil rights or employment legislation. The Virgin Islands’ code has no law
protecting the disabled in employment, yet it mirrors the ADA’s “substantially limits
one or more of a person’s major life activities” language when defining disability in
tax notification laws. V.I. CODE ANN. § 2498(a)(2) (1994). Florida uses the ADA’s
definition in its Fair Housing Act. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.22(7) (West 1997 & Supp.
2002).
Alabama and Mississippi have no comprehensive definitions of “disability.”
The following state statutes define “disability” differently from the ADA: ALASKA
STAT. § 18.80.300(12) (Michie 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(3) (Michie Supp.
2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-51(15) (West 1995 & Supp. 2002); IDAHO CODE
§ 67-5902(15) (Michie 1995); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103(I) (West 2001); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4553(7-A) (West 2002); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 11503(f) (1998 & Supp. 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10: 5-5(q) (West 1993 & Supp. 2002);
N.Y. EXEC. § 292(21) (McKinney 2001); P.R. LAWS ANN. § 501(d) (1999); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 43-33-560 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 74.29.010 (West 2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(8) (West 1997 & Supp. 2001).
Some states have language that is similar to the ADA’s, yet they lack key elements
in their definitions: CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926(i) (West Supp. 2002) (omitting
“substantially”); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-2(3) (1998) (omitting “being regarded as
having such an impairment”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(Subd. 13) (West 1991 &
Supp. 2002) (substituting “materially” for “substantially”); VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-3
(Michie 1998) (omitting “being regarded as having such an impairment”); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 35-13-205(a)(ii) (Michie 2001) (omitting “record of such an
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published a Civil Justice Survey of State Courts that found that
employment discrimination plaintiffs in the seventy-five largest
201
The
counties in the United States won forty percent of cases.
survey, however, did not distinguish among the different types of
discrimination claims and thus provided no data specific to disability
202
discrimination allegations.
Extensive research revealed no other
study or report concerning the outcomes of disability discrimination
cases in state court.
One might believe that the 1996 survey’s forty percent figure
proves that disability discrimination plaintiffs enjoy greater success in
state court than in federal court, but this is not necessarily the case.
Studies of case outcomes filed under federal anti-discrimination
statutes other than the ADA have shown that plaintiffs achieve a
greater number of positive outcomes under those statutes even in
203
federal court.
By extension, it stands to reason that plaintiffs might be winning
forty percent of all employment discrimination cases filed in state
court because of success in cases involving claims relating to race,
gender, age, and other protected categories, while still experiencing
significant judicial hostility to disability discrimination claims.
Nevertheless, disability advocates have not, thus far, alleged that
disability plaintiffs find state courts to be an inhospitable forum, and
thus, plaintiffs may achieve more favorable results in state courts than
they do in the federal forum. To eliminate this uncertainty, studies
should be conducted to determine the rates at which employers and
plaintiffs prevail in disability discrimination cases filed in state court.
2.

EEOC charge processing
The EEOC charge data serves as one source of specific information
204
concerning ADA case outcomes outside of the judicial forum. The
impairment” and “being regarded as having such an impairment”).
201. Lea S. Gifford et al., Contract Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 1996, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ (last modified Oct. 25, 2002). Presumably, the cases
surveyed included those asserting federal civil rights claims, state civil rights claims,
and a combination of both.
202. Id.
203. See Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 4, at 248, 253 (finding that judicial
outcomes under Title VII appear to be more pro-plaintiff than those under the
ADA); Juliano & Schwab, supra note 10, at 570 (showing that over fifty percent of
sexual harassment cases filed in federal district court result in a win for the plaintiff).
204. Under the ADA, individuals must file a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC and exhaust their administrative remedies before proceeding to file suit in
federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000) (stating that the “powers, remedies
and procedures” for enforcement of the ADA shall be identical to those established
for enforcement of Title VII). Title VII provides private parties with a private cause
of action, which can be pursued after they have received a right to sue from the
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205

EEOC is the federal agency that enforces Title I of the ADA.
Between 1992 and 2002, the EEOC resolved 187,503 ADA charges,
206
These
17.5% of which were resolved in the employees’ favor.
“merit resolutions” included negotiated settlements, withdrawal of
charges after the charging party received the benefits she desired,
207
successful conciliation of charges, and EEOC determinations that a
charge had merit in cases where it could not be successfully
208
conciliated.
In its 32,742 merit resolutions, the EEOC obtained
$436 million in monetary benefits for charging parties without
209
litigation, averaging about $13,316 per resolution.
In recent years, the EEOC appears to have obtained less per claim
under the ADA than it has under some of the other statutes that it
enforces. In fiscal year 2002, 4,123 ADA merit resolutions were
reached, and the EEOC obtained $50 million for those charging
210
By
parties, or, on average, approximately $12,127 per charge.
comparison, in fiscal year 2002, the EEOC had 11,930 merit
resolutions in Title VII cases, for which it obtained $141.7 million (on
211
average $11,877 per charge), 2,694 merit resolutions under the
ADEA for which it recovered $55.7 million in monetary damages (on
212
average $20,675 per charge), and 290 merit resolutions under the
EEOC. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
205. Id. § 12117(a).
206. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA) Charges FY 1992-FY 2002, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/adacharges.html (last modified Feb. 6, 2003) [hereinafter ADA Charges FY 1992-FY 2002].
Although the 17.5% figure might seem low, it should be noted that 28.8% of charges
were administratively closed without any decision on the merits of the case. Id.
Administrative closures occur because there is a failure to locate or establish contact
with the charging party, the outcome of related litigation renders further processing
of the charge inappropriate, there is lack of EEOC jurisdiction, or the charging party
requests a right to sue in court before resolution of the issue. Allbright, supra note 3,
at 406.
207. Under the ADA, the EEOC must attempt to conciliate discrimination charges
that are found to be meritorious to avoid litigation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000).
The provision states that the “powers, remedies and procedures” for enforcement of
the ADA shall be identical to those established for enforcement of Title VII. Title VII
establishes that if the EEOC determines that the allegations in a charge of
discrimination are true, it “shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion.” Id. § 2000e-5(b).
208. See ADA Charges FY 1992-FY 2002, supra note 217.
209. Id.
210. Id. In 2000 the EEOC had 4,835 ADA merit resolutions for which it obtained
$47.9 million in relief, averaging $9,907 per charge. Id.
211. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 Charges FY 1992-FY 2002, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/vii.html (last
modified Feb. 6, 2003).
212. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Age Discrimination in
Employment Act Charges FY 1992-FY 2002, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/
adea.html (last modified Feb. 6, 2003).
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213

Equal Pay Act (EPA), for which it obtained $10.3 million in
214
damages (on average $35,517 per charge).
While the relatively low monetary recoveries under the ADA
deserve attention, an explanation may rest in the probability that
some ADA charging parties seek primarily non-monetary benefits.
The parties may wish primarily to receive a reasonable
accommodation at work or to retain their jobs after a leave of
absence, and therefore, might be satisfied with relatively small
damages awards. In addition, according to one study, the percentage
of complainants obtaining favorable results with ADA charges is
within the range of favorable results achieved under other statutes
215
enforced by the EEOC. Between 1992 and 2000, 12.4% of charging
parties received benefits under the ADA, while 10.9% received
benefits under Title VII, 10.2% received benefits under the ADEA,
216
and 15.2% obtained benefits under the EPA.
Many of the individuals who turn to the EEOC for redress of
disability discrimination do not have conditions traditionally
considered to be severe disabilities. By far, the most common type of
charge filed with the agency is for “orthopedic and structural
impairments of the back,” as 15% of all ADA charges filed between
217
1992 and 2002 involved these conditions.
The EEOC reports that
people with these impairments received $63,216,739 in dollar
benefits during that time period, which far exceeds the relief
218
obtained by the EEOC for those in any other disability category.
Likewise, individuals with allergies, chemical sensitivities, alcoholism
213. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1998).
214. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Equal Pay Act Charges (includes
concurrent charges with Title VII, ADEA, and ADA) FY 1992-FY 2002, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/epa.html (last modified Feb. 6, 2003).
215. See Kathryn Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study of the
Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 50 KAN. L. REV. 1, 44 (2001) (comparing the results of processing ADA
charges by the EEOC with other types of charges filed by the EEOC, such as charges
under Title VII and the ADEA).
216. Id. at 44. More specifically, the study’s findings break down as follows:
Charging parties withdrawing charges with benefits: ADA—5.1%; Title VII—
4.5%; ADEA—5.1%; EPA—6.2%;
Charging parties receiving settlements: ADA—5.5%; Title VII—5.3%;
ADEA— 4.4%; EPA—7.4%; and
Successful conciliation: ADA—1.8%; Title VII—1.0%; ADEA—0.7%; EPA—
1.5%.
217. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, ADA Charge Data by
Impairments/Bases-Merit Factor Resolutions, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats.adareceipts.html (last modified Feb. 6, 2003).
218. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, ADA Charge Data—Monetary
Benefits, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-monetary.html (last modified
Feb. 6, 2003).
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219

and drug addiction received $11,499,864 in monetary relief.
Hearing impairments, vision impairments, paralysis, and nonparalytic orthopedic impairments, other than back problems,
constituted only 15.3% of charges filed during the same period even
though these are probably the conditions that are most commonly
220
thought of as disabilities. The 15.3% figure offers further evidence
that many of the most seriously disabled do not attempt to enter the
workforce, and those that do may not feel empowered to combat
unlawful discrimination by seeking governmental intervention.
C. What Is Known and What Is Not Known
The available data indicate that the ADA has not achieved an
221
increased employment rate for individuals with disabilities.
The
evidence is far less conclusive in the area of dispute outcomes. Much
remains unknown concerning settlements, informal dispute
resolution in the workplace, and the outcomes of state court cases,
which have not been comprehensively studied.
Nevertheless, the startlingly low plaintiff win rates in federal court
reveal that the ADA rarely functions as an effective remedial
222
mechanism when cases come before federal judges.
Furthermore,
EEOC statistics divulge that many individuals who seek redress under
the statute do not have what are traditionally thought of as severe
disabilities, and thus a significant portion of those who obtain relief
223
from employers may not be the most needy or deserving plaintiffs.
219. Id.
220. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, ADA Charge Data by
Impairments/Bases—Receipts, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-receipts.html
(last modified Feb. 6, 2003). The EEOC obtained a total of $64,965,341 in monetary
relief for individuals with these impairments. By category, the relief obtained is as
follows: $9,771, 179 for the hearing impaired; $9,760,423 for the visually impaired;
$3,254,882 for those with paralysis; and $42,178,857 for those with non-paralytic
orthopedic impairments other than back problems. U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm’n, ADA Charge Data—Monetary Benefits, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-monetary.html (last modified Feb. 6, 2003).
221. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans With Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform,
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 1019-20 (2003) (stating that the failure of the ADA to
effectively increase the employment rate for individuals with disabilities is due to the
restrictive judicial interpretation of the term “disability” within the Act); S. Elizabeth
Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why Disabilities Law Claims Are
Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603, 606 (2001) (introducing some commentators’
thoughts as to why the ADA has not increased the employment rates for individuals
with disabilities); see generally Schwochau & Blanck, supra note 165 (stating that the
ADA has not led to increased employment among disabled people).
222. See American Bar Association, Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I
Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403,
403-04 (1998) (dispelling the myth that the ADA burdens employers by presenting
results of a study of 1,248 ADA Title I cases that showed that the defendants won 92%
of the time).
223. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, ADA Charge Data by
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While it might be premature to conclude that the ADA is fully a
224
“windfall for defendants,” the evidence makes it reasonable to
deduce that the statute is falling short of satisfactorily meeting the
225
goal of corrective justice.
Regardless of the empirical data,
however, Title I of the ADA is flawed because of its definition of the
term “disability,” which hampers the promotion of the law’s
objectives. A variety of alternatives for amending the ADA’s statutory
226
definition will be explored in the remainder of this Article.
III. AMENDING THE ADA: OPTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND
ANALYSIS
A. The Recommendation: Redefining Individuals with Disabilities As Those
with Mental or Physical Impairments that Have Been Subjected to A Pattern
of Discrimination and Developing Specific Categories of Covered Impairments
1.

The general principle
This Article argues for the jettisoning of the ADA’s current
definition of “disability” and the adoption of a new approach.
Individuals with disabilities should be defined as those with mental or
physical impairments that have been subjected to a pattern of
227
discrimination by public policy or widespread private practice. The
ADA should further authorize the EEOC to determine which
disabilities have been associated with systematic discrimination and to
publish guidance listing the covered conditions or disability
categories. Those with impairments that fit the listed criteria would
be presumed disabled. Those whose conditions do not fit within any
of the listed categories would be presumed non-disabled, though they
would be free to submit to the EEOC a request, along with a
supporting brief, arguing that their impairments be added to the list
of covered conditions the next time the list is reviewed and updated.

Impairments/Bases—Receipts, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-receipts.html
(last modified Feb. 6, 2003).
224. See Colker, A Windfall for Defendants, supra note 4, at 103-10 (arguing that suits
filed under the ADA since its inception overwhelmingly result in a victory for
defendants).
225. See id. at 126 (comparing the troubling statistics that indicate a 92% victory
rate for defendants in ADA Title I cases with Congress’ intent in passing the ADA,
which was to eliminate discrimination for the forty-three million Americans with
disabilities).
226. See discussion infra Part III (providing options, recommendations, and
analysis for amending the definition of the term “disability” found within the ADA).
227. The “record of” and “regarded as” branches of the definition should be
retained. See infra Part III.A.2.
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The proposed amendment would address many of the problems
228
With clear guidance and a
that plague the current definition.
categorical list of covered impairments, courts are less likely to reach
inconsistent decisions and will not need to make invasive inquiries
229
concerning each plaintiff’s daily life activities.
Furthermore,
plaintiffs will no longer need to prove the severity of their disabilities
to attain protected status, avoiding the conundrum of having to
establish both substantial limitation and job qualification. In
addition, those whose symptoms are controlled with medication will
not be excluded from coverage so long as their underlying conditions
230
meet a listed criteria.
Thus, employers who exclude persons with
epilepsy or mental illness because they do not want such individuals
in their workplaces will no longer be able to avoid liability simply by
asserting that these plaintiffs’ ailments are sufficiently controlled by
mitigating measures.
In general, under the new definition, the ADA’s protected class
would become more easily discernible and would more readily
resemble the traditional model of a discrete and insular minority. As
a consequence, the courts would no longer struggle with the
definition of disability in each case, and the goal of corrective justice
231
could be more effectively promoted.
2.

The mechanics: determining disability status under the proposed
standard
The task of establishing a mechanism by which to determine what
constitutes a disability under the proposed definition is a complex
and challenging one. The following is a suggested approach that
would likely need to be adjusted and refined as the system is tested
through time.
The EEOC should be assigned the task of developing a list of
impairments and categories of conditions associated with a known
pattern of discrimination. Establishing the list of disabilities that have
been the targets of discrimination will initially be demanding and
time-consuming, and it should be delegated to a special EEOC
department with appropriate experts. This department should also
periodically review and update the list in light of emerging
228. See discussion supra Part I.C.
229. See infra note 297 (discussing circumstances under which disputes and
inconsistent decisions concerning disability status may still arise).
230. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (holding that
the court should evaluate mitigating circumstances when determining whether an
individual qualifies as a person with a disability under the ADA).
231. See supra Part III.A.4 (discussing the impact of the proposed revision on the
ADA’s current protected class).
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information concerning contemporary discriminatory trends and
medical developments or findings that might influence such trends.
The EEOC would have to turn to a variety of data sources to gather
evidence concerning patterns of discrimination. First and perhaps
foremost, it should turn to historical evidence. It is well known, for
example, that individuals with mental disabilities and epilepsy have
been subjected to extreme forms of discrimination. In the past, many
state statutes allowed for the involuntary sterilization of the “insane,
232
idiotic, imbecile, feebleminded or epileptic.” Approximately 60,000
Americans were involuntarily sterilized pursuant to state eugenics
233
laws throughout the country.
Similarly, individuals with obvious
234
disfigurements have often been marginalized. There is convincing
evidence that deaf individuals have traditionally been subjected to
235
discrimination. Likewise, individuals with contagious diseases have
236
The case of
been subjected to widespread exclusionary practices.
HIV is a contemporary example. HIV positive persons have been
excluded by employers, educational institutions, and other segments
237
of society.
Individuals with paralysis and blindness have also been
232. See, e.g., H.R. 299, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2002) (honoring the memory of
Carrie Buck who was the first person sterilized under Virginia’s 1924 Eugenical
Sterilization Act).
233. See, e.g., id. (indicating that Virginia sterilized approximately 8,000 people,
while 60,000 were sterilized throughout the United States). In 2001, the Virginia
General Assembly issued a joint resolution expressing its regret for its former policy
and noting that some of those affected had no mental impairment at all. H.R.J. Res.
607, 2001 Sess. (Va. 2000); see S.J. 79, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2002) (noting that
Raymond Hudlow, who was sterilized after being committed to the Virginia Colony
for Epileptics and Feebleminded because he had repeatedly run away from his
abusive father, later had a distinguished military career during World War II).
234. See, e.g., supra note 159 and accompanying text.
235. See PAUL HIGGINS, OUTSIDERS IN A HEARING WORLD 25-27 (1980) (tracing the
history of discrimination against deaf individuals). For example, in the 1800s,
owners of all ships arriving in the United States were legally required to provide the
names of all deaf persons on board and to pay bond to keep the deaf persons from
becoming public charges. Id. at 25. Many states held deaf individuals incompetent
to make contracts. Id. According to the author, hearing workers are still frequently
promoted over deaf workers, even when the hearing employees were trained by
those same deaf workers. Id. at 27. See also Randy Lee, Equal Protection and A Deaf
Person’s Right to Serve As A Juror, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 81, 96 (1989-90)
(providing examples of “irrational restrictions” on deaf individuals in the twentieth
century).
236. See Michael Adam Burger & Lourdes I. Reyes Rosa, Your Money and Your Life!
AIDS and Real Estate Disclosure Statutes, 5 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 349, 368 (1993)
(discussing a real estate agent’s ability to disclose the HIV status of someone who
died in a seller’s house, indicating that “history demonstrates that fear and ignorance
lead to discrimination, both inside and outside the context of contagious diseases”);
see also Deborah Weinstein, Employment Discrimination: AIDS Education and Compliance
with the Law, 1 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 85, 103 (1992) (examining how the ADA
will affect those with AIDS, stating that “[t]hroughout history and across cultures, the
law has not protected people with contagious diseases from discrimination”).
237. See Scott Burris, Disease Stigma in U.S. Public Health Law, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS,
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marginalized by virtue of the fact that architectural and
communication barriers have made many of mainstream society’s
238
goods and services inaccessible to people with those impairments.
Admittedly, while discrimination against individuals with certain
239
disabilities is already well known, there is generally a dearth of
scholarship in this area. To the extent possible, research would need
to be conducted to develop comprehensive records of laws,
regulations, policies, and practices that sanctioned discrimination
against individuals with disabilities. It should also be noted that if the
EEOC finds that a particular condition was targeted for
discrimination in the past, but it is convinced that societal attitudes
have changed and that no such discrimination occurs in the present,
the impairment should not be included in the list of covered
disabilities.
For purposes of determining which impairments fall within the
ADA’s scope, the EEOC should consider discrimination by both
public and private entities that has been instituted by law, regulation,
policy or common business conduct. The agency should also focus
not only on discrimination in employment, but also on exclusionary
policies in other realms, such as health care, education, and public
life. For example, the practices of sterilizing individuals with mental
disabilities and barring those with obvious disfigurements from
240
appearing in certain public places justifies inclusion of these
impairments within the scope of the statute, even though these forms
of discrimination occurred outside the workplace. The ADA’s
findings suggest the appropriateness of these criteria. They speak of
a general history of “purposeful unequal treatment” and of
individuals with disabilities being “relegated to a position of political
179, 186 (2002) (arguing that “obscenity review rules, criminal exposure laws,
immigration restrictions, and mandatory testing requirements” are types of structural
discrimination that both authorize and even require discrimination against those
with HIV).
238. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2000) (referring to the “discriminatory effects of
architectural, transportation, and communication barriers . . . [and] failure to make
modifications to existing facilities and practices”).
239. See, e.g., HIGGINS, supra note 235, at 23-29 (criticizing early scholars’
assumptions about deaf individuals); JAMES W. TRENT, INVENTING THE FEEBLE MIND: A
HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1994) (tracing the
development of social programs and public treatment of individuals with mental
disabilities from the 1840s to the 1980s); Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the
World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 841, 851 (1966) (indicating
that disabled persons have been turned away from places where, legally, the public is
to be accommodated).
240. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (allowing the sterilization of Carrie Buck
after she gave birth to an allegedly “feeble-minded” child); see also supra note 159 and
accompanying text.
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241

powerlessness in our society.”
The concern, therefore, is societal
discrimination in all realms of life.
242
Where historical evidence is not available, the EEOC could utilize
census data, national polls, and studies that are conducted by either
the agency or other institutions. These sources would be useful in
determining which disabled individuals are currently excluded from
the workplace and other segments of society. The ADA itself refers to
the information in these sources as providing support for the passage
243
of anti-discrimination legislation.
The EEOC could also look at its own records of discrimination
charges. If certain conditions are particularly prevalent in its
inventory and if many of the charges of discrimination involving
those conditions have generated merit-based resolutions, those
244
conditions should be added to the list of covered impairments.
Thus, the EEOC might add cancer and carpal tunnel syndrome to its
list, if its statistical data supports their inclusion.
The EEOC will continue to gather information about
contemporary discriminatory practices. Since individuals can file
245
EEOC charges without an attorney, many charging parties are
unlikely to know the contents of the categorical list and will,
consequently, file charges of discrimination involving conditions that
are not included. The EEOC could dismiss such charges without
investigation because those individuals will be presumed nondisabled.
However, the agency should periodically review its
inventory, and if it becomes apparent that a large number of
241. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000).
242. It should be noted that it is not clear when evidence becomes “historical.”
There is no line of demarcation as to the passage from “contemporary trends” to
“history.” For example, is discrimination against those with HIV “historical” or
“contemporary,” given that it began only after the disease was first identified in 1981?
See Carlos Del Rio & James W. Curran, Epidemiology and Prevention of Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, in 1 PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1340 (Gerald L. Mandell et al. eds., 2000)
(emphasizing that while communicable disease law has historical roots, HIV does not
have the same historical depths); see also Paul Cartledge, What is Social History Now?, in
WHAT IS HISTORY NOW? 23-24 (David Cannadine ed., 2002) (exploring the notion of
the “time of history” and indicating that historians need not necessarily think in
terms of millennia or centuries rather than decades or years).
243. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6) (2000) (observing that different sources such as
national polls have shown that disabled individuals “occupy an inferior status in our
society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and
educationally”).
244. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, ADA Charge Data by
Impairment/Bases—Receipts (providing charge statistics received from July 26, 1992 to
September 30, 2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-receipts.html (last
modified Feb. 6, 2003).
245. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2000) (stating that a charge may be filed under
the EEOC by the person aggrieved or on behalf of the person aggrieved).
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individuals with a particular non-covered condition are filing charges
of discrimination, the EEOC should commence a study or inquiry to
determine whether employers are commonly discriminating against
246
qualified applicants and employees with the impairment.
Furthermore, individuals whose charges are dismissed because they
do not meet the definition of “disability” could submit a request to
the EEOC’s reviewing department, along with a supporting brief,
arguing that their conditions should be added to the list.
The rare instances in which impairments, such as HIV, are newly
discovered could present a unique challenge for the EEOC. In many
instances, discrimination against those with newly discovered
conditions will be prohibited because the impairments will fall into
one of the pre-existing categories on the list, such as mental
impairment, disfigurement, or contagious disease. When this is not
the case, the new conditions should be withheld from the list until
proof exists of a pattern of discrimination against individuals with
those ailments. Consequently, there would be a lag time between the
initial appearance of discrimination and its prohibition with respect
to the impairment in question.
Nevertheless, the lag time should be short and could be quite
useful. The process would be expedited by the allowance of charging
party petitions to the EEOC and by the mandate that charge
inventories be periodically reviewed to discern emerging patterns of
discrimination. A certain amount of time might, in fact, be necessary
in some instances to allow medical professionals to determine
whether it is safe for individuals with the new condition to work in
particular environments and how they can best be accommodated. It
might be unreasonable to require businesses to employ such
individuals without reliable data providing assurance that their
employment will not compromise their own welfare or that of others
247
in the workplace
or significantly erode the integrity of the
248
business.
246. The EEOC could initiate a Commissioner’s charge concerning the condition.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000) (discussing the ability of a member of the Commission
to file a charge). It could then investigate the matter by interviewing some of the
charging parties and employers in question and gathering available medical and
employment documentation to evaluate the strengths of the discrimination claims.
247. Employers need not hire or retain an individual who would pose a direct
threat to herself or others. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (finding that the ADA permits a regulation of the
EEOC that authorizes employers to refuse to hire a person with a disability if job
performance would endanger that person’s own health).
248. Employers are not required to hire or retain an individual who is not
qualified for the job or cannot be reasonably accommodated. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a),
12112(b)(5)(A), 12112(b)(6) (2002) (providing exceptions for employers who can
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An additional difficulty is created by the fact that some conditions,
such as vision and hearing impairments, vary by degree from mild to
severe. The EEOC would have to determine at what level of severity
ADA coverage applies. For example, the agency could determine
that statutory protection is triggered by a diagnosis of legal blindness
and that those who merely need corrective lenses are not covered,
because they are not routinely subject to societal discrimination.
Similarly, those with hearing loss may not be covered unless they wear
hearing aids, which are a visible indication of their impairment that
249
could leave them vulnerable to discrimination.
The list is unlikely to be extensive. While some conditions, such as
epilepsy, HIV, deafness, and blindness would be named individually,
others would be categorized in broader classifications, such as mental
250
impairments, contagious diseases, and disfigurements due to illness,
injury, or medical procedures. The “record of” and “regarded as”
prongs of the definition would still be useful under the new statutory
251
definition. To illustrate, if a disease such as HIV becomes curable,
individuals might face discrimination because of their medical record
of having suffered a life-threatening, contagious disease, even though
they have been fully cured. Likewise, if an individual is wrongly
perceived by an employer as having mental illness or a contagious
disease and is consequently subjected to an adverse employment
decision, she could be covered under the “regarded as” category.
Finally, the designation of specific categories of covered disabilities
will not prevent each case from receiving individualized attention
from the courts because the courts will still engage in an independent
prove that accommodating the disabled worker would create an undue hardship for
the employer or that the individual lacks the requisite job qualifications).
249. See HIGGINS, supra note 235, at 25-27 (emphasizing the obstacles faced by deaf
persons in the workplace, particularly highlighting a civil service requirement that a
worker be able to hear conversational speech for particular jobs); Lee, supra note
235, at 96 (discussing the history of discrimination against deaf individuals, including
in the workplace).
250. This is a very broad category, but its breadth is justified by the history of
discrimination suffered by individuals who were considered in any way mentally
impaired. The sterilization laws, for example, applied to the “insane, idiotic,
imbecile, feebleminded, or epileptic.” See H.R. 299, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2002).
Mental impairments should include learning disabilities, mental retardation, manic
depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, brain-head injury, clinical depression, and
other psychological disorders. If appropriate, the EEOC could, however, narrow this
category to exclude conditions that are not associated with systematic discrimination,
as might be true for certain phobias. The ADA already explicitly excludes from the
definition of disability the following: transvestitism, transsexualism, pedophilia,
exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical
impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders; compulsive gambling, kleptomania,
or pyromania; or psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal
use of drugs. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (2000).
251. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(B)-12102(C) (2000).
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assessment of issues other than disability status. It will merely
diminish litigation concerning the threshold question of membership
in the protected class. When a plaintiff meets one of the listed
criteria, the question of whether that plaintiff is disabled will be
answered, but the court will have to evaluate several other issues, such
as whether the employer acted with discriminatory animus, whether
252
the plaintiff was qualified for the job in question,
whether
253
requested accommodations were reasonable, and whether the
254
individual posed a direct threat in the workplace.
3.

Achieving corrective justice and other justifications for the proposed
standard
In general, the classes protected by the federal anti-discrimination
laws are groups that are known to have experienced systematic
255
discrimination in this country.
Historical records provide strong
justification for the need for government intervention to safeguard
the rights of African-Americans, women, members of minority
religions, those with certain national origins, and the elderly, since
each of these groups has suffered discrimination both in the past and
256
257
the present.
Corrective justice is, therefore, the operative goal
within the civil rights model.

252. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (prohibiting an employer from
discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability).
253. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (requiring an employer to make reasonable
accommodations for disabled individuals).
254. See id. § 12113(b) (granting the employer a defense for not hiring a disabled
individual if the individual posed a direct threat to health or safety in the workplace);
see also infra Part III.A.5 for a discussion of whether the proposed revision will
generate cost savings.
255. See id. § 12101(a)(discussing the history of discrimination in the United
States against individuals with disabilities).
256. See MINOW, supra note 137, at 47 (stating that “we confront historical practices
giving particular significance to traits of difference along lines of race, ethnicity,
disability, gender, and religion”). With respect to religious discrimination, see
County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989)
(hypothesizing that when the Founders wrote the First Amendment, its protections
were meant to extend only to the various Christian sects) and MORTON BORDEN, JEWS,
TURKS, AND INFIDELS 11-14 (1984) (describing state constitutional provisions that
prohibited non-Christians or non-Protestants from holding office). Concerning
national origin discrimination against Hispanics, see Johnson v. DeGrady, 512 U.S.
997, 1013 (1994) (discussing historical discrimination against Hispanics with regards
to voting). With respect to sex discrimination, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 684 (1973) (providing insight into a history of “romantic paternalism” that has
been rooted in the national consciousness of the United States). The history of
discrimination against African Americans and Japanese Americans in this country is
also well known. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989a(a) (2000) (providing that Congress
recognizes the wrongs committed against those of “Japanese ancestry by the
evacuation, relocation, and internment of civilians during World War II”); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 552 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(discussing race discrimination in the United States); Korematsu v. United States,
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Defining disability by reference to known patterns of
discrimination would be consistent not only with the other federal
anti-discrimination laws, but also with the language of the ADA itself.
The ADA’s “Findings and Purposes” section twice mentions the
history of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. In its
second paragraph, it asserts that “historically, society has tended to
258
isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities,” and in its seventh
paragraph, it refers to the “history of purposeful unequal
259
treatment” to which this population has been subjected.
This article argues that historical records of discrimination should
be utilized as a primary source of evidence for purposes of
establishing the list of covered conditions. Historical evidence is a
tool that is conventionally used by courts in analyzing discrimination
and Equal Protection claims in order to determine whether
particular groups should be granted statutory or constitutional
260
protection. For example, in Frontiero v. Richardson, which held that
323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (affirming conviction of a Japanese American for
remaining in a military area from which people of Japanese ancestry had been
excluded). With respect to age discrimination, see 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000)
(discussing pervasive exclusion of older employees from the workplace in the
ADEA’s “Statement of Findings and Purpose” ); Carroll L. Estes, The Aging Enterprise
Revisited, in CRITICAL GERONTOLOGY: PERSPECTIVES FROM POLITICAL AND MORAL
ECONOMY 135-38 (Meredith Minkler & Carroll L. Estes eds., 1998) (discussing social
perceptions concerning the “problem of age” and discriminatory policies that create
dependency); Anita Silvers, Aging Fairly: Feminist and Disability Perspectives on
Intergenerational Justice in MOTHER TIME: WOMEN, ETHICS AND AGING 208 (Margaret
Urban Walker ed., 1999) (“[U]ntil relatively recently . . . the declining capability
imagined to accompany the biological changes associated with old age . . . mandated
the exclusion of older individuals from the workplace.”).
It should be noted that Title VII and the EPA protect anyone who has suffered
discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, religion, or sex, including nonminorities.
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000) (prohibiting any wage
discrimination on the basis of sex); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682-84 (1983) (ruling that Title VII prohibits discriminatory
conduct against male employees on the basis of sex); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 281-83 (1976) (analyzing Title VII and holding that Title
VII prohibits race discrimination against whites). The origin of these statutes,
however, is rooted in concern about the disadvantaged status of particular groups,
and the laws were designed to combat the long history of employment discrimination
against minorities and women in this country. John Greenya, Rites of Passage: The
Civil Rights Act of 1964, WASH. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 35 (describing the history of
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 971-74 (4th ed. 1997) (discussing the
historical background of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, which were instrumental in
narrowing the gap between men’s and women’s earnings).
257. See supra Part I.A (discussing the term).
258. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000).
259. Id. § 12101(a)(7).
260. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a statutory preference that
deemed wives of male military personnel automatic dependents for purposes of
obtaining greater housing allowances and medical and dental benefits, but denied
husbands of female members of the armed forces such status unless they in fact
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classifications based on sex are inherently suspect and subject to
heightened scrutiny, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]here can be
no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination.
Traditionally, such discrimination was
rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in
261
practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”
262
Similarly, in Cleburne v. Cleburne, a case that found a city’s
requirement of a special use permit for the establishment of a group
home for the mentally retarded to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, Justice Marshall argued that “the mentally retarded
have been subject to a ‘lengthy and tragic history’ of segregation that
263
The majority, however, found that
can only be called grotesque.”
mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification requiring
heightened scrutiny, although it revoked the special permit
264
requirement under a rational basis analysis. An added advantage of
developing scholarship concerning the history of discrimination
suffered by individuals with disabilities is that it might bolster future
attempts by disabled plaintiffs to win Fourteenth Amendment cases.
Greater awareness of past discriminatory practices might convince the
courts that those with particular disabilities in fact constitute a
suspect class deserving of heightened scrutiny.
Within the ADA context, Justice Ginsburg, in her Sutton v. United
265
Air Lines concurrence, emphasized the ADA’s legislative findings
that individuals with disabilities are “persons ‘subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
266
powerlessness in our society.’”
She further observed that persons
with poor eyesight are not among those who are “politically
powerless, nor do they coalesce as historical victims of
267
discrimination.”
Consequently, Justice Ginsburg asserted that the

depended on their spouses for over half of their support).
261. Id. at 684.
262. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
263. Id. at 461 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
264. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 (stating that the refusal to treat mental
retardation as a quasi-suspect class does not leave them entirely unprotected from
discrimination because any legislation distinguishing between mental retardation
and those without mental retardation must still be “rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose”). Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority’s rational basis
analysis. See id. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(indicating that heightened scrutiny analysis should have been applied in this case).
265. 527 U.S. 471, 494 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
266. See id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1995)).
267. Id.
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petitioners’ severe myopia did not serve to qualify them as members
268
of the “discrete and insular minority” of individuals with disabilities.
Within the civil rights realm, evidence concerning past and present
patterns of discrimination has long been utilized to determine the
scope and character of protected discrete and insular minorities.
Similarly, the ADA should, in following the civil rights model, protect
individuals who have been subjected to systematic marginalization, as
evidenced by historical data.
One should acknowledge that disability discrimination may be
distinguished from discrimination against other groups on several
grounds. First, the adverse effects of disability discrimination do not
always pass from one generation to another. Individuals with
disabilities often have able-bodied children who do not face the same
kind of marginalization. Still, disabled parents who are denied
employment opportunities will not be able to provide well for their
children, and thus their progeny may be disadvantaged in much the
269
same way as are the younger generations of other minority groups.
Second, discrimination against individuals with disabilities is
sometimes the result of an act of omission rather than the
consequence of an intentionally committed wrong. People in
wheelchairs, for example, were unable to gain entry to many public
places, but this was more often the result of a failure by the
proprietor, or another individual, to provide wheelchair access as
opposed to an active prohibition barring disabled individuals from
participating in mainstream activities. Nevertheless, discrimination,
whether by acts of commission or omission, must be redressed.
Some scholars have suggested an alternative theory, arguing that
270
the ADA be redefined to protect those who suffer stigma or

268. Id. In her opinion, Justice Ginsburg concludes that Congress utilizes the
phrase “discrete and insular” to denote its objective of limiting ADA coverage “to a
confined, and historically disadvantaged, class.” Id. at 494-95.
269. See 2000 N.O.D./Harris Survey, supra note 167 (finding that 29% of disabled
households live in poverty whereas the same is true for only 10% of nondisabled
households).
270. See Korn, supra note 72, at 448 (proposing that the classification of disability
under the ADA be redefined as “any physical impairment that is associated with
stigma”). Korn suggests that a stigma attaches to a disabled person when others
perceive him or her as “disadvantaged,” irrespective of the degree of success attained
by such disabled person. Id. at 447. See also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination,
Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 436 (2000) (aligning the concept of stigma
with “systematic disadvantage” and elaborating a theory that “the very social practices
that attach systematic disadvantage to particular impairments are what create the
category of people with disabilities”).
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subordination.
In a thought-provoking piece, Samuel Bagenstos
writes the following:
The statutory “disability” category should embrace those actual,
past, and perceived impairments that subject people to systematic
disadvantages in society. And the concept of stigma should play an
important evidentiary role. Impairments that are stigmatized—that
type people who have them as “abnormal or defective in mind or
body”—are particularly likely to meet the systematic disadvantage
272
standard.

This approach overlaps with the “patterns of discrimination”
approach, but there are several important differences. The terms
“stigma,” “subordination,” and “disadvantage” are far more vague
than the concept of actual discrimination, which requires historical
research and factual evidence.
Bagenstos does not provide
definitions for the terms “subordination” and “disadvantage.” He
273
does, however, discuss the concept of stigma at some length.
Stigma is a psychological concept that exists in the minds of those
274
who negatively perceive people with disabilities. Bagenstos refers to
a definition provided by Erving Goffman, who describes stigma as an
“‘undesired differentness’ from what society deems to be ‘normal’ or
275
expected.”
According to Goffman, stigmatization occurs “when
prevailing social practices treat particular ‘undesirable’ traits as
276
universally discrediting.”
Determining whether a particular characteristic is perceived as
universally discrediting would require an assessment of people’s
inner psyche and could not be accurately accomplished by scientific
or empirical means. The approach proposed in this Article carries
the advantage of being centered upon proof of discriminatory
actions, not attitudes, and actions can be more easily researched and
documented. Moreover, the proposal articulated in this Article
provides a mechanism for establishing a clear list of covered
conditions or condition categories. Therefore, this approach, rather
271. See id. at 401 (urging the courts to adjust their approach to interpreting the
ADA’s definition of “disability” in light of the fact that disability results in
subordination).
272. Id. at 445 (citation omitted).
273. See id. at 436-45 (explaining that stigmatization arises from three “seemingly
disparate” problems-societal prejudice, stereotyping, and neglect—but arguing that,
in fact, the three problems are intertwined).
274. See id. at 437 n.154 (describing stigma as the “master status” or “the attribute
that colors the perception of the entire person,” and quoting Lerita M. Coleman,
Stigma: An Enigma Demystified, in THE DILEMMA OF DIFFERENCE: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY
VIEW OF STIGMA 211, 219 (Stephen C. Ainlay et al. eds., 1986)).
275. Id. at 437 (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF
SPOILED IDENTITY 5 (1963)).
276. Id.
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than one focusing on the more intangible concept of stigma, should
provide better guidance and prove more accessible to employers,
litigants, and the courts.
Bagenstos himself recognizes one limitation of the stigma standard.
At any given time “[a]ttitudes and practices may differ across
277
Having acknowledged the
subcultures and economic sectors.”
limitation that different social attitudes, subcultures, economics,
and/or other factors might have with respect to a finding of disability
status under the stigma approach, Bagenstos clarifies that plaintiffs
should not have to prove universal stigmatization of their specific
278
condition or limitation.
Plaintiffs should, however, according to
Bagenstos, demonstrate that they are being deprived of a “significant
slice” of the opportunities available to them in general society; and
furthermore, that such deprivation results from sufficiently
widespread “prejudiced and stereotyped attitudes . . . [and]
279
exclusionary practices.”
Thus, while Bagenstos argues that the
underlying issue to be proven for purposes of establishing disability
status is stigma rather than actual discrimination, he relies at least
partially on a similar body of evidence—specifically, data concerning
widespread exclusionary practices—to prove membership in the
protected class.
4.

Effect on the existing protected class
Admittedly, some individuals, who may currently meet the
technical definition of a disabled individual, might lose ADA
protection under the proposed revision because their condition
would no longer qualify under the new category of “disability”—one
that is based on a known pattern of discriminatory practices and
policies. This might be true, for example, for some people with heart
disease or high blood pressure. It might also be true for people with
very rare diseases, with respect to which little evidence of past or
280
current discrimination might exist.
However, because federal
281
courts are ruling in favor of so few plaintiffs, these individuals will
277. Id. at 452.
278. Id.
279. Id. Regarding the level of stigmatization that plaintiffs must prove, Bagenstos
would require prejudicial and stereotypic attitudes to be “widely enough held” and
exclusionary practices “widely enough implemented.” Id.
280. Many rare diseases will, however, fit into one of the broader categories of
disability because they are contagious or cause disfigurement or mental impairment.
In addition, individuals with rare conditions will retain the ability to petition the
EEOC for inclusion of the impairment on an updated list and could be successful if
they present evidence of discrimination suffered by other patients whom they met in
treatment or support group settings.
281. See discussion supra Introduction.
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be losing little in terms of potential for success in federal court. They
282
will also retain the ability to sue under applicable state laws and to
assert common law causes of action.
In this country we have chosen to prohibit discrimination only on
283
specific grounds. Federal law does not forbid discrimination based
on many categories, such as party affiliation, parental status, sexual
284
285
preference, or physical appearance. Limiting the protected class
of individuals with disabilities to those who have been excluded from,
or marginalized within, mainstream American society would be
consistent with our general legislative approach of allowing
governmental meddling with employment decisions only in very
286
restricted circumstances.
In addition, many of the individuals who could lose their
“disability” status under the proposed revision might find that their
employers remain receptive to their requests for relatively
inexpensive accommodations because many employers may wish to
avoid potential litigation under the ADA or applicable state law.
Employers might also desire to show good will through flexibility and
accommodation to promote high morale and productivity in the
workplace.
Moreover, contemporary workers enjoy the benefits of several
relevant labor laws. For example, under state workers’ compensation
statutes, compensation is available to employees for injuries “arising
282. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. Many states have adopted
language that is identical to the ADA’s, and these states may not choose to revise this
language, even if revisions are made to the federal statute’s definition.
283. By contrast, the South African Constitution prohibits governmental
discrimination based on many more classifications. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2 (Bill of
Rights), § 9(3) (1996). Specifically, it provides: “The state may not unfairly
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including
race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, color, sexual
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.”
Id.
284. As of 2000, eleven states—California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Wisconsin, as well as the District of Columbia, had laws prohibiting workplace
discrimination based on sexual preference. Harvey Berkman, Not Many Gays Filing
Bias Suits, NAT’L L.J., May 22, 2000, at B1, B3.
285. See Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment
Discrimination on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2035 n.2
(1987) (noting that physically unattractive people in our society face harsh forms of
discrimination) (citation omitted).
286. As one court stated, “[f]ederal courts ‘do not sit as a super-personnel
department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions. No matter how medieval
a firm’s practices, no matter how high-handed its decisional process, no matter how
mistaken the firm’s managers, the ADEA does not interfere. Rather our inquiry is
limited to whether the employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior.’”
Chapman v. AI Trans., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Elrod v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991)).
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287

out of and in the course of employment.” The Black Lung Benefits
288
Act provides compensation for American coal miners who develop
289
Under the
pneumoconiosis associated with work in coal mines.
290
Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), individuals with serious
291
health conditions can receive up to twelve weeks, annually, of leave
292
The FMLA establishes that
from work to care for themselves.
293
employers with fifty or more employees, must provide scheduling
accommodations for seriously ill individuals even if these persons do
not have “disabilities” for purposes of the ADA. In 2002, California
294
passed its own, more generous version of the FMLA. The California
295
statute, entitled the Paid Family Care Leave Act, applies to all
employers and provides employees with a right to six weeks of paid
296
leave.
Arguably, if American society wishes to provide further workplace
benefits and protections to people with a very broad range of mental
and physical limitations, it should do so through expansion of labor
laws, such as the FMLA and workers’ compensation statutes. The civil
rights model is an inappropriate avenue for such endeavors, as civil
287. Matthew B. Duckworth, Comment, The Need for Workers’ Compensation in the
Age of Telecommuters, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 403, 409 (2001) (citing directly
the language used by forty-two states and the District of Columbia to define
“compensable injury” under the various workers’ compensation statutes); see Mark A.
Rothstein et al., Using Established Medical Criteria to Define Disability: A Proposal to
Amend the Americans with Disabilities Act, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 278 (2002) (noting that
while variations occur in each state’s workers’ compensation system, many similarities
also exist, such as reimbursement for medical bills and a percentage of lost wages for
employees suffering from injuries and illnesses “occurr[ing] during the course and
scope of their employment”). In addition, over fifty percent of states include in their
workers’ compensation statutes a “heart and lung” provision, which creates “‘an
irrebutable [sic] presumption that any cardiovascular or respiratory impairment
suffered by a firefighter [(and depending on the jurisdiction, police officers and
other public employees)] is work-related.’” Id. at 280 (citing Mark A. Rothstein,
Refusing to Employ Smokers: Good Public Health or Bad Public Policy?, 62 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 940, 952 (1987)).
288. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (2000).
289. Id. § 901(a).
290. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
291. See id. § 2611(11) (defining a “serious health condition” as “an illness, injury,
impairment, or physical or mental condition” that involves either “inpatient” medical
care or “continuing treatment” by a specified medical service provider).
292. See id. § 2612(a)(1)(D). When medically necessary, an employee suffering
from a “serious health condition” may take leave on an intermittent basis. Id.
§ 2612(b)(1).
293. See id. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (providing that the term “employer” under the FMLA
refers to any person “engaged in commerce” with fifty or more employees, thus
applying the provisions of the FMLA to such employers).
294. S.B. 1661, 2001-02 Leg., 2001-02 Sess. (Ca. 2002).
295. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 3300-3305 (West 2003).
296. Id. § 3301(a). Employers can require employees to use two weeks of paid
vacation during the leave. Id. § 3303(g). The program is fully funded by employee
contributions to the State Disability Insurance system. Id. § 3300(f).
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rights laws are traditionally limited by design to constitute antidiscrimination mandates that provide corrective justice, protecting
discrete and insular minorities that have suffered exclusion and
marginalization. Those with eyeglasses and high blood pressure
might, in fact, deserve special treatment or attention, however, this
should be granted outside of the civil rights context.
5.

Cost savings and judicial sympathy
The statutory revision this Article proposes is likely to reduce the
administrative costs of litigation and statutory enforcement. Given
clear guidance, competent attorneys will not file suit on behalf of
plaintiffs whose impairments are not included within the list, and
courts, in most cases, will easily make determinations concerning
297
whether particular plaintiffs are protected by the ADA.
The
proposed standard will eliminate many of the suits filed by plaintiffs
with trivial impairments that now burden court dockets and will
298
substantially reduce prolonged litigation over disability status.
These reductions should save significant costs for plaintiffs who
otherwise file futile cases, for employers, and for the taxpaying
public.
Because those with impairments that are included within the list
will be presumed disabled, some cases that are currently filtered out
through an analysis of disability status will survive this threshold
inquiry.
For these cases, the efficiency gained through the
categorical approach to disability determinations might be offset by
prolonged litigation concerning other issues that now never reach
the courts because plaintiffs do not survive the disability inquiry. For
example, courts might more frequently be called upon to make
determinations concerning whether the employer acted with
297. There may still be disputes concerning certain plaintiffs’ conditions that fall
within the broad categories of impairments, which are necessarily more vague than
specific illnesses, such as cancer or HIV. For example, the categories of mental
impairments and disfiguring conditions due to illness, injury, or medical procedure
are meant to be very broad and inclusive. Consequently, employers might challenge
a plaintiff’s disability status, alleging that she is simply a poor performer rather than
mentally impaired or that she is physically unattractive rather than disfigured. It will
then be up to the plaintiff to prove a diagnosis of a mental ailment or of an illness,
injury or procedure that caused disfigurement. Furthermore, there may be some
disputes concerning the accuracy or validity of a plaintiff’s diagnosis. Nevertheless,
the disputes concerning disability status should be far less frequent and less
complicated than those prevalent under the current definition of disability.
298. The EEOC will also be spared the task of conducting lengthy investigations to
determine each charging party’s disability status. However, its cost-savings in this
regard will be offset by the need to compose the initial list of covered conditions and
impairment categories, to review petitions for addition of conditions to the list, and
to update the list periodically.
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discriminatory animus, whether the plaintiff was qualified for the job
299
300
in question, whether requested accommodations were reasonable,
301
and whether an individual posed a direct threat in the workplace.
From a policy standpoint, however, these should be the issues upon
which the courts center their attention in disability discrimination
cases. Rather than focusing the inquiry solely upon the plaintiffs and
scrutinizing their daily and private life activities in an effort to
determine whether they are disabled enough, courts should expend
their energies on analyzing whether discrimination actually occurred.
The other federal employment discrimination laws provide a
model for this methodology because they generate little debate over
protected status. Title VII and the EPA cover all individuals, because
everyone has a race, national origin, religion, and sex, as understood
302
by these statutes. The ADEA protects all individuals who are forty
303
When one claims discrimination on the
years of age and older.
basis of race, gender, religion, national origin, or age, one needs little
proof to establish membership in the asserted protected class.
In addition, employers who know they will likely triumph in
challenging a plaintiff’s disability status might have little incentive to
hire individuals with impairments or to conduct dialogues with
employees concerning their need for reasonable accommodations.
Employers might risk litigation concerning adverse hiring or
accommodation decisions, knowing that if challenged, they will likely
prevail by convincing the court that the plaintiff is not entitled to
ADA protection. The proposed revised definition could provide
more powerful incentives for employers to be receptive to employees
with disabilities because all those with listed conditions will be
presumptively covered under the ADA. It might also encourage
parties to engage in early, serious settlement discussions to avoid the
costs and risks of litigating the many complexities of their cases
beyond the disability status issue.

299. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (prohibiting employment discrimination on
the basis of disability against otherwise qualified individuals).
300. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (providing that prohibited employment
discrimination includes an employer’s “not making reasonable accommodations to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability” unless the employer shows that the reasonable accommodation would in
fact subject the employer’s business operation to “undue hardship”).
301. See id. § 12113(b) (allowing employers to screen out individuals posing a
“direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace”).
302. See id. § 2000e-2(a) (2000)(outlawing employment practices that discriminate
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)(1) (2000) (prohibiting sex discrimination in the workplace).
303. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2000).
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To the extent that some believe that the federal judiciary is biased
304
against ADA plaintiffs, the proposed standard might also foster
judicial sympathy towards members of the protected class. No
definitive study has been conducted concerning the role of judicial
sympathy in case decisions. This area is ripe for further research,
especially with respect to ADA and other civil rights cases, which are
often emotionally and ideologically charged. The little evidence that
does exist, however, suggests that judges’ personal responses to
plaintiffs factor into their decisions, and thus, consideration of
305
judicial sympathy is important.
Several informative studies relate to issues other than the ADA.
Neal Feigenson found that the level of judicial sympathy and desire
to assist the victim in tort cases is determined to some degree by the
extent of the victim’s suffering. Furthermore, the greatest
compassion is felt for those whose accidents occurred under
306
exceptional circumstances.
By extension, it follows that judges
would be most sympathetic towards those with severe disabilities and
those with exceptional hardships due to systematic marginalization.
A study of the courts’ application of the federal sentencing guidelines
noted that the tendency of judges in particular regions to depart
downward in cases of drug couriers, female white-collar criminals,
and firearm offenders, suggests that judges are occasionally motivated
by their own sympathies and political views, even when sentencing
307
convicted criminals.
Studies of the influence of various factors on judicial decisions
found that female circuit court judges tended to vote more frequently
than their male colleagues in favor of female plaintiffs who brought
304. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model,
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 22 (2000) (exploring the various hypotheses
suggested to explain why plaintiffs under the ADA consistently lose in the courts, and
referring specifically to the “backlash” thesis, which theorizes that “judges are not
simply confused by the ADA [but] rather, they are resistant to it”). Diller qualifies
his remarks about the backlash theory, however, by stating that judicial backlash
against ADA plaintiffs does not necessarily stem from a “deliberate or intentional
campaign.” Id. Instead, Diller argues that apparent judicial resistance to the ADA
could have arisen due to a general lack of judicial comprehension of the ADA
statute, which subsequently would have led to a failure to “accept the premises
underpinning” the ADA. Id.
305. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
306. See Neal R. Feigenson, Essay, Merciful Damages: Some Remarks on Forgiveness,
Mercy and Tort Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1633, 1637-38 (2000); Neal R. Feigenson,
Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1, 50 (1997).
307. See Michael S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
An Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299, 364 (1996) (suggesting
that judicial sympathy, rather than the presence of atypical or extraordinary factors,
may be the cause for consistent departures from the federal sentencing guidelines
for a particular offense in a particular geographic region).
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308

Title VII gender discrimination suits.
This is most likely because
they were better able to identify with the female plaintiffs. Similarly,
one study of courts of appeals cases concluded that black circuit court
judges were more responsive to employment discrimination claims
309
than were their white colleagues.
Based on this very limited evidence and the extremely low ADA
310
plaintiff win rate, it is reasonable to argue that the segment of
individuals bringing ADA claims apparently fails to win the sympathy
of the courts and fosters an impression that ADA plaintiffs do not
311
deserve governmental protection.
Some judges have clearly
articulated their frustration with ADA claims brought by plaintiffs
whom they consider unworthy.
312
In Fussel v. Georgia, the court decried the fact that current
interpretations of the ADA may lead it to become “the greatest
313
The court expressed grave concern
generator of litigation ever.”
that the statute would not assist its intended beneficiaries, but rather,
would be distorted by greedy trial attorneys who will force federal
judges to become “little more than glorified worker’s compensation
314
referees.”

308. See Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 20-21 & n.42 (2001)
(discussing studies showing that female appellate judges are more receptive to
female plaintiffs claiming gender discrimination suits, but not necessarily to female
plaintiffs claiming race discrimination)(citing Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges’
Sex and Race on Judicial Decision Making on the United States Courts of Appeals,
1981-1996 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Chicago) (on file with
author)). George notes, however, that “[f]ederal district court studies have
repeatedly failed to find a gender effect in any issue area, including sex
discrimination.” Id. at 21; see also Sue Davis et al., Voting behavior and gender on the U.S.
courts of appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129, 130-32 (1993) (analyzing a study concerning
voting patterns of women circuit court judges in the areas of employment
discrimination, search and seizure, and obscenity, and finding that “statistically
significant differences” exist between male and female judges in employment
discrimination and search and seizure cases).
309. See George, supra note 308, at 24 (citing Crowe, supra note 308, at 84). The
author notes, however, that other studies discerned no racial differences in the
judging of employment discrimination cases. Id.
310. See discussion supra Introduction.
311. See ‘Judicial Hostility’ Limiting Reach of the ADA: Decisions Focus on Coverage,
Panelists Say, 19 Emp. Discrimination Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 59 (July 10, 2002)
(reporting on the proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Association’s
National Policy Forum in which speakers noted that ADA claims face “significant
judicial hostility”).
312. 906 F. Supp. 1561 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
313. See id. at 1577 (holding that a discharged police officer with a benign
essential tremor did not have a disability and emphasizing that “Congress, in its
wildest dreams or wildest nightmares” did not intend “to turn every garden variety
worker’s compensation claim into a federal case”) (quoting Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp.,
891 F. Supp. 482, 485 (W.D. Ark. 1994)).
314. See id. at 1577 (quoting Pedigo, 891 F. Supp. at 486).
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In her study, Ruth Colker confirmed that the type of disability
alleged is a statistically significant factor in determining the outcome
315
Individuals alleging that they suffered
of ADA cases on appeal.
from diabetes or extremity impairments were more likely to succeed
316
than other plaintiffs.
Colker speculates that the plaintiffs’ cases
may have “seemed like more sympathetic cases to judges on
317
appeal.”
The Supreme Court’s ADA decisions further highlight the
importance of the nature of the disability to the Court’s
determination. While most rulings on the definition of disability
318
319
have been adverse to plaintiffs, Bragdon v. Abbott, which involved a
320
plaintiff who was HIV positive, is an exception to the general trend.
Although Ms. Abbott did not suffer any symptoms, the Supreme
Court strained to characterize her “dread and fatal disease” as a
321
disability. The opinion acknowledged that HIV does not physically
322
prevent a woman from reproducing.
For example, artificial
insemination could eliminate the risk of transmission to the woman’s
323
Further, the Court acknowledged that the risk of
partner.
transmitting the disease to one’s child can be as low as eight percent
324
with antiretroviral therapy. Nevertheless, the Court categorized Ms.

315. See Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 4, at 273 (indicating that plaintiffs
with substance abuse disabilities did not do as well as plaintiffs with extremities
impairments).
316. See id. at n.77 (noting that “[e]xtremities impairments included missing
limbs or digits; hand, arm, or shoulder impairments and arthritis”). Colker devised
separate categories for back impairments and paralysis. Id. However, one should
note that Colker conducted the study before the Court in Sutton ruled that
mitigating measures, such as effective medication, must be considered in
determining whether an individual has a disability. Id. Because diabetes is often well
controlled by medication, plaintiffs with diabetes are far less likely to prevail in a
post-Sutton case. See, e.g., Berg v. Norand Corp., 169 F.3d 1140 (8th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a diabetic employee who could not work a forty to fifty hour week was
not disabled); Beaulieu v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 23 Fed. Appx. 811 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding that an employee’s diabetes did not substantially limit his major life
activities, and he did not have a disability for purposes of the ADA); Orr v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding similarly).
317. Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 4, at 273.
318. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 184-85 (2002)
(finding that the plaintiff’s inability to perform repetitive manual task did not fit
within the definition of disability under the ADA); Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527
U.S. 471, 472 (1999) (refusing to find the plaintiffs disabled within the meaning of
the ADA).
319. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
320. Id. at 628.
321. Id. at 641.
322. See id. at 641 (noting that HIV does not render conception and childbirth
impossible but does pose a public health risk).
323. Id.
324. Id. at 640.
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Abbott’s HIV as a disability that substantially limited her major life
325
activity of reproduction.
Courts that primarily hear cases involving conditions commonly
targeted for discrimination, such as deafness or HIV, will likely find
disability discrimination cases emotionally powerful and will tend to
326
rule more readily for plaintiffs on pre-trial motions. Further, under
the proposed standard, the way in which cases are presented will
327
become more compelling for the courts. Proof of a history of abuse
and marginalization associated with a particular condition would
likely elicit a more sympathetic response from the court than that
which is evoked when the court skeptically analyzes plaintiffs’ levels of
functionality by focusing on questions such as whether they can
328
garden or brush their teeth.
B. Other Options Are Inferior to the Proposed Revision
1.

The definition of disability should not be left as is
An alternative option to the proposed revision is to leave the ADA
unaltered. The fact that a small minority of plaintiffs prevail in
federal courts under Title I of the ADA may not in itself be
329
troubling. Many individuals may actually benefit from Title I of the
330
ADA through cases resolved by settlement. Perhaps most cases with
strong claims settle at an early stage of litigation, and the cases left for
adjudication are weak cases brought by unreasonable plaintiffs.
Some commentators argue that poor lawyering, more than any
331
other factor, accounts for the unbalanced case outcomes.
They
contend that weak advocates fail to consider numerous factors
332
necessary to survive summary judgment in ADA cases.
This
325. Id. at 641-42.
326. See discussion supra Part III.A.4.
327. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
328. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 202 (2002)
(analyzing the inability of the plaintiff to perform manual tasks and refusing to
recognize her carpal tunnel syndrome as a disability under the ADA).
329. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text (discussing studies revealing the
very low win rates of ADA plaintiffs in federal courts).
330. See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (noting that ADA plaintiffs may be gaining
significant benefits through settlements).
331. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Dan R. Gallipeau, Judges and Juries: Why Are So
Many ADA Plaintiffs Losing Summary Judgment Motions, and Would They Fare Better Before
a Jury? A Response to Professor Colker, 19 REV. LITIG. 505, 515 (2000) (arguing that poor
lawyering skills, rather than restrictive judicial interpretation, is the primary cause for
the number of ADA summary judgment losses).
332. See id. at 574-75 (noting specifically that the problem appears to arise from
lawyering that fails to account for important regulations and to plan for effectively
presenting a strong case theory and convincing evidence).
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argument suggests that the only needed change with respect to ADA
litigation is that lawyers become better-trained and more skilled in
333
crafting ADA claims to win their cases.
Leaving the statutory definition unchanged, however, would be
misguided. First, the vagueness and other defects of the definition of
334
“disability” necessitate revision regardless of case outcome statistics.
It is necessary to find an alternative that will not require courts to
engage in the burdensome and arbitrary task of individually assessing
335
each plaintiff’s functionality level. The current standard often leads
to invasive and humiliating inquiries as well as to inconsistent court
decisions in which the court must find that the plaintiff is both
336
sufficiently disabled and qualified for the job in question.
A
plaintiff’s disability status should not depend on his or her precise
337
level of functioning.
Instead, a more workable mechanism for
characterizing disability must be found.
Second, this writer finds unconvincing the argument that ninetyfive percent of ADA plaintiffs lose in federal court because their cases
338
are uniformly weak.
It remains unclear why plaintiffs would bring
weaker cases under the ADA than under the other anti339
discrimination statutes.
Moreover, plaintiffs’ attorneys have a
strong economic incentive to filter out cases likely to produce no
340
financial gain.
Additionally, because the ADA’s enactment
341
occurred in 1990, it seems unlikely that the vast majority of
attorneys taking ADA cases remain inexperienced and unskilled in
342
litigating these statutory claims.

333. See id. at 576 (explaining that lawyers for ADA plaintiffs must increase their
knowledge and skills with respect to the ADA to ensure successful private
enforcement of the ADA).
334. See discussion supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the complications created by the
current vague language of the statute).
335. See Feldblum, supra note 81, at 146 (stating that individual assessment creates
difficulties for both the courts and for the attorneys arguing the cases).
336. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
337. See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
338. See Van Detta & Gallipeau, supra note 331, at 517 (stating that the majority of
ADA cases fail because the lawyers have not adequately prepared or presented
sufficient evidence to support their clients’ cases under the ADA).
339. See discussion supra Introduction (comparing plaintiffs’ win rates under the
ADA to their success rates under other anti-discrimination statutes).
340. See Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 4, at 258 n.54 (stating that if
lawyers frequently do not prevail under the ADA then they will not receive significant
compensation).
341. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000).
342. See Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 4, at 258 n.54 (speculating that
poor lawyering would self-correct over time and therefore could not be the cause for
the current legal failures under the ADA).
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Finally, once it becomes common knowledge that defendants will
likely prevail in federal court, employers will become increasingly
343
reluctant to settle. In light of the highly publicized Supreme Court
344
decisions of recent years
and the abundant commentary
concerning these cases, many employers will realize that ADA
plaintiffs have a low probability of prevailing in federal courts, which
345
may discourage future settlements.
Assuming that the courts
remain inclined to find that few individuals meet the “disability”
346
the ADA may become even more ineffective as a
criteria,
mechanism for redress of employment discrimination.
2.

The scope of the definition should not simply be broadened by eliminating
the definition’s restrictive terminology
A second alternative is to revise the definition of disability to
broaden its scope. The restrictive terms “substantially limits” and
347
“major life activities” contained in the statute could be eliminated,
so that the statute would prohibit discrimination against all
individuals who have a mental or physical impairment, have a record
of such an impairment, or are perceived as having such an
348
impairment.
The ADA’s new definition could mandate that
employers cannot make adverse employment decisions based on any
physical or mental impairment, regardless of the degree to which the
condition impairs the individual in question, unless the impairment
renders the person unqualified without possible and reasonable
accommodation or the person constitutes a direct threat in the
349
workplace.
This approach would eliminate the requirement of
343. Cf. Tucker, supra note 186, at 353-54 (emphasizing that numerous negative
judicial decisions have weakened the impact and authority of the ADA).
344. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002)
(holding that the plaintiff’s carpel tunnel syndrome did not qualify as a disability
under the ADA because it did not substantially limit her major life activities);
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999)(holding that the plaintiff’s high
blood pressure did not qualify as a disability under the ADA); Sutton v. United Air
Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that myopic twin sisters did not state a claim
under the ADA because they could not show that they had a physical impairment
substantially limiting them in any major life activity).
345. See Colker, A Windfall for Defendants, supra note 4, at 108 (citing figures
showing that defendants prevailed in ninety-four percent of ADA cases).
346. See Tucker, supra note 186, at 354 (asserting that many courts have attempted
to narrow the scope of the ADA).
347. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining a disability as “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
[an] . . . individual”).
348. Feldblum, supra note 81, at 163.
349. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), (b)(5)(A), 12113(b) (2000)(establishing that the
ADA proscribes the making of adverse employment decisions based on disabilities
unless a disability renders the person unqualified, and no reasonable
accommodation is possible or the person will pose a direct threat in the workplace).
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individualized assessment of each plaintiff’s precise level of
350
functionality for purposes of determining disability status.
Just as other civil rights laws prohibit consideration of race,
national origin, religion, sex, and age in employment decisions in
351
most instances, the ADA could also prohibit consideration of all
352
mental and physical impairments unless special circumstances exist.
In this sense, broadening the definition of disability would bring the
ADA closer to the traditional civil rights model, which precludes
353
decision-making based on clearly discernible characteristics.
The
inclusion of more people within the ADA’s protected class is
354
consistent with the other federal anti-discrimination statutes. Title
VII and the EPA apply to all individuals because everyone possesses a
race, national origin, religion, or sex as those terms are used in these
355
statutes. The ADEA also applies to a large segment of the American

350. See discussion supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the inefficiency of the current
statute’s method of inquiring into each plaintiff’s daily activities).
351. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000)(prohibiting consideration of race, national
origin, religion and sex in employment decisions); 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000)
(prohibiting consideration of age in employment decisions for people forty years of
age or older); see also supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing exceptions
to the general rules created by certain statutory defenses).
352. For additional articles recommending an expansion of the definition of
disability, see Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities,
Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 318
(2000) (suggesting that the ADA be amended to remove the “substantial limitation in
a major life activity” language for cases that do not involve a request for
accommodation); Anderson, supra note 81, at 129, 140 (asserting that the
“substantially limits” requirement should be eliminated from the ADA and that
“working” should not be considered as a separate major life activity); Eichhorn, supra
note 81, at 1473-77 (recommending that the ADA be revised so that it prohibits
discrimination “on the basis of disability” rather than covering a specific protected
class, consisting of qualified individuals with disabilities); Miranda Oshige Mcgowan,
Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. REV. 27, 137 (2000) (arguing
for a broad definition of the “regarded as” prong of disability so that the ADA would
protect any individual that an employer believes is less qualified for the position as a
result of generalizations about the individual’s perceived physical or mental
impairment); Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the
Scope of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 107, 131
(1997) (suggesting that an individual’s ability to work should not be assessed in
determining an individual’s disability status); Tucker, supra note 186, at 373 (listing a
number of possible revisions to the ADA but warning that if Congress revisits the
ADA, it may reduce, rather than expand, the protections of the statute).
353. See Feldblum, supra note 81, at 163 (stating that if the ADA’s definition of
disability is broadened, the statute will closely mirror Title VII, which provides broad
protections against discrimination).
354. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (applying Title VII to all individuals subjected
to discrimination by employers because of their national origin, race, religion or
sex).
355. See id. § 2000e-2(a) (establishing that it is unlawful for employers to
discriminate on the basis of race, national origin, religion or sex); 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)(1) (1998) (prohibiting wage discrimination based on sex, with some
exceptions).
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population, since it protects all individuals who are forty years of age
356
and older.
Title VII, the EPA, and the ADEA, however, rely on the theory that
minorities and non-minorities can perform work equally well because
the immutable characteristics addressed in those statutes are
357
irrelevant to job performance.
In general, these statutes only
358
prohibit conduct based on irrational prejudice and assumptions.
The ADA, by contrast, forbids employers to exclude individuals
because of mental and physical impairments that potentially affect
their work performance, and it requires employers to accommodate
359
those conditions in ways that may generate significant costs.
Expanding the population entitled to ADA protection to the point of
including most Americans, and thus perhaps dramatically raising
employers’ compliance expenditures, may adversely impact the
360
business community and, by extension, the American workforce. It
might also provide incentives for employers to avoid hiring
individuals with any known impairment because the risk of unlawful
hiring decisions may seem smaller than the risk of facing
accommodation demands from an ever-growing number of
361
workers.
Furthermore, significantly expanding the scope of the protected
class might encourage more plaintiffs with trivial impairments to
362
assert ADA claims.
Elimination of the definition’s restrictive
language will not necessarily promote the statutory goals of
363
participatory, distributive, and corrective justice. It may not lead to
increased employment opportunities for those who are actually
marginalized or to a redistribution of resources to those who are
364
most needy and deserving.
356. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631(a) (2000) (stating that it is unlawful to
discriminate on the basis of age against individuals forty years of age or older).
357. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text (discussing the various theories
underlying the civil rights statutes).
358. See discussion supra Part I.C.3 (analyzing the purpose of the civil rights
statutes).
359. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000); see discussion supra Part I.C.3 (discussing
potential costs that may be incurred by employers attempting to accommodate
workers’ physical and mental impairments).
360. See discussion supra Part I.C.3 (noting that the current statute requires the
employers to absorb the cost of providing reasonable accommodations).
361. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (examining the financial
burden on employers complying with ADA requirements).
362. See discussion supra Part III.A.5 (discussing the current problem of an
excessive number of trivial ADA claims crowding court dockets).
363. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (discussing the current statutory
goals of the ADA and emphasizing the importance of obtaining corrective justice for
disabled individuals).
364. See supra notes 283-86 and accompanying text (delineating the statutory goals
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Finally, it is unrealistic to believe that Congress will be inclined to
dramatically enlarge the class of individuals with disabilities, given the
365
Several
general climate of dissatisfaction with the ADA.
commentators have noted that criticism of the ADA extends beyond
366
the realm of the courts.
The media’s disparagement of the ADA
through print, television news, and sitcoms, indicates that the
American public may not support liberalizing the statutory terms to
367
incorporate more individuals. As Professor Bonnie Poitras Tucker
notes, reopening discussions concerning the ADA will likely lead
Congress to diminish the protections offered by the ADA rather than
368
to expand its scope.
The proposal this Article offers in some ways broadens the
369
contours of the ADA’s protected class.
Specifically, highly
functional individuals who are disfigured or epileptic would be
covered under the proposal even though they are not substantially
370
limited in any major life activity.
However, the proposal also
narrows the range of protected individuals by excluding any
condition not associated with a known pattern of discrimination from
371
the list, even if the condition is potentially disabling. For example,
conditions such as cardiovascular disease and arthritis are unlikely to
372
Consequently, one may reasonably believe that both
be covered.
Congress and the public would be receptive to the proposal.
of the ADA).
365. See Tucker, supra note 186, at 338-39 (noting the country’s failure to embrace
the ADA’s premises, and the current backlash against the statute).
366. See Cary LaCheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber Lung, and Juggler’s Despair, The
Portrayal of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Television, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
223, 227 (2000) (stating that the media is increasingly critical of the ADA and seems
to focus on allegedly fraudulent cases filed under the statute); see also Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Foreword-Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and
Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 9-10 (2000)
(denoting the negative portrayal of the ADA by the media).
367. See LaCheen, supra note 366, at 228, 232 (explaining that the popular media
is conveying the belief that people bringing cases under the ADA are attempting to
cheat the system, thus encouraging intolerance of the ADA).
368. See Tucker, supra note 186, at 388 (asserting that the current political climate
encourages antagonism towards civil rights statutes and that it would be unwise to
amend the ADA at this time).
369. See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (describing the proposal in detail).
370. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) (defining the term “disability” as any physical
or mental impairment that “substantially limits” an individual’s “major life
activities”).
371. See discussion supra Part III.A.4 (explaining that some individuals currently
covered by the definition of disability may lose this protection under the proposed
standard).
372. See Baldwin, supra note 160, at 44 (suggesting that negative attitudes towards
persons with impairments vary, depending upon the condition in question, and
stating that those with arthritis or cardiovascular disease are generally viewed
positively in American society).
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3.

Funding the unfunded mandate
A more palatable option might be to eliminate the restrictive
language of the disability definition as described above and to fund
the cost of the ADA’s non-discrimination mandate so that it is not
absorbed by the business community. This could be done through
tax credits, tax deductions, or a claims submission process by which
employers could be reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses.
Expenditure of additional public dollars in this manner, however,
does not seem justified at this time.
The current tax code already makes limited tax deductions
373
available for costs associated with ADA compliance. Employers who
hire individuals with mental or physical disabilities can receive a
maximum credit of $2,400 per qualified employee (forty percent of
the individual’s qualified first year wages up to $6,000) for those who
374
begin work before December 31, 2003.
In addition, the tax code
allows employers to receive credits or deductions for expenses
associated with tangible personal property, such as special equipment
or assistive listening devices provided to individuals with disabilities
375
pursuant to Title I requirements.
For example, “eligible small
businesses” can obtain a credit of up to $5,000 for improvements
376
made in order to provide access to persons with disabilities.
In spite of this, hiring individuals with disabilities might produce
costs for which employers do not receive adequate tax relief through
the above-described provisions. These costs might include high
reasonable accommodation expenses, diminished productivity,
absenteeism, and higher health insurance or workers’ compensation
expenses. These costs, however, are very difficult to quantify and
predict and, therefore, cannot be fully addressed through the tax
code.
In addition, the limited evidence that exists concerning reasonable
accommodations suggests that often they may not require large out377
of-pocket expenditures.
A number of studies were conducted at
373. See Ellen D. Cook, Tax Breaks Cut the Cost of Americans with Disabilities Act
Compliance, 69 PRACTICAL TAX STRATEGIES, Sept. 2002, at 145, 145-52 (detailing tax
relief available to employers providing reasonable accommodations in order to
integrate disabled individuals into the work force).
374. 26 U.S.C. § 51 (2000).
375. Id. §§ 44, 179.
376. Id. § 44(a); Cook, supra note 373, at 147.
377. See Peter D. Blanck, The Economics of the Employment Provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act: Part I—Workplace Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 902
(1997) [hereinafter Blanck, Economics of Employment Provisions] (analyzing various
studies and concluding that the average cost for reasonable accommodations was
minimal and that the changes made benefited employees with disabilities as well as
employees without disabilities).
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Sears, Roebuck and Co. from 1978 to 1996 concerning the
378
The studies
accommodation of individuals with disabilities.
revealed that during the years 1993 to 1996, the average direct cost of
379
accommodating such workers was forty-five dollars. Studies by the
Job Accommodation Network (“JAN”) found that over two-thirds of
380
effective accommodations cost less than $500. A 1990 GAO report
revealed that fewer than one-quarter of workers with disabilities
381
received accommodations.
The report also stated that when
accommodations were provided, 51% did not require the employer
to incur any direct cost, 30% cost less than $500, and only 8% cost
382
more than $2000.
Other commentators have stated that the
average cost of accommodations for disabled employees who require
383
them is $200.
However, no major studies have been conducted
since the mid-1990s, and none has addressed the indirect costs of
accommodations, such as those associated with scheduling
adjustments, added breaks, or acceptance of reduced productivity.
Furthermore, the statistics might be skewed in that only one-quarter
384
to one-third of individuals with serious disabilities have jobs, and
the reasonable accommodation figures might grow dramatically if
many more of the disabled were employed.

378. See Peter D. Blanck, Communicating the Americans with Disabilities Act,
Transcending Compliance: 1996 Follow-up Report on Sears, Roebuck and Co., ANNENBERG
WASH. PROGRAM REP. at 18 (1996) [hereinafter Blanck, Communicating], cited in
Blanck, Economics of Employment Provisions, supra note 377, at 902. Sears, Roebuck and
Co. conducted a series of studies analyzing the economic implications of workplace
accommodations between 1978 and 1996—before and after Title I’s July 26, 1992
effective date. Id.
379. Id. As discussed in this section, “direct” costs or expenses are those associated
with payment for devices, equipment or construction of mechanisms to assist people
with disabilities. “Indirect” costs are those generated by scheduling adjustments,
acceptance of reduced productivity or other accommodations that do not require
actual payment on the part of the employer. Id.
380. President’s Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities, Job
Accommodation Network (JAN) U.S. Quarterly Report, Oct.-Dec. 1994, at 14, cited in The
Economics of the Employment Provisions, supra note 377, at 902.
381. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: REPORTS ON
COSTS OF ACCOMMODATIONS 4, 19 (1990), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d27t7/
140318.pdf. (citing Berkeley Planning Associates, A Study of Accommodations Provided to
Handicapped Employees by Federal Contractors, 20, 29 (1982)).
382. Id. (citing Berkeley Planning Associates at ii, 28).
383. See Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed.
Reg. 8,578, 8,584 (1991) (noting that a “study projecting the impact of the
‘Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989’ estimated that the average cost of
accommodations was $200”) (citing Daniel Finnegan et al., The Costs and Benefits
Associated with the Americans with Disabilities Act, 38 (1989)).
384. See Schwochau & Blanck, supra note 165, at 272 (reporting that the current
population survey suggests only thirty percent of those with disabilities work); 2000
N.O.D./Harris Survey, supra note 167 (finding thirty percent as well).
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Some commentators argue that ADA compliance can actually lead
385
Programs designed to
to significant cost savings for employers.
enhance workplace safety to accommodate those with disabilities can
improve the productivity, job tenure, and absenteeism rates of all
386
members of the workforce.
By reducing the number of accidents
that occur in the workplace, safety programs and devices can
387
diminish overall costs associated with job injuries.
In addition,
employees with disabilities often have lower turnover rates than ablebodied workers, and their absenteeism and productivity have been
388
found to be equivalent to those of their nondisabled counterparts.
Commentators further note that removing more individuals with
disabilities from the ranks of the unemployed and impoverished
would reduce welfare expenditures and thus would save significant
389
costs for the public at large.
The ADA is not unique in imposing financially burdensome
requirements upon employers. While one might argue for a general
diminishment of the public responsibilities placed upon employers,
concern should not be focused particularly on the ADA. American
law imposes countless unfunded mandates on American employers.
390
For example, they must pay a minimum wage and overtime
385. See The Economics of the Employment Provisions, supra note 377, at 902 (reporting
that according to JAN studies, almost two-thirds of accommodations resulted in
company savings exceeding $5000, which were associated with “lower job training
costs and insurance claims, increased worker productivity, and reduced
rehabilitation costs after injury on the job”).
386. See id. at 902-05 (recognizing that accommodations involving advanced
technology have been shown to produce benefits for employees with and without
disabilities in terms of increased work productivity, injury prevention, reduced
workers’ compensation and reduced worker absenteeism).
387. See id. at 902 (reporting that, according to JAN, companies realize
approximately fifty dollars in benefits for every dollar spent on an effective
accommodation).
388. See Michael Ashley Stein, Labor Markets, Rationality, and Workers with Disabilities,
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 314, 323-26 (2000). The author reports that according
to the U.S. Office of Vocational Rehabilitation, ninety-one percent of workers with
disabilities were rated “average” or “better than average,” while nondisabled
employees were given approximately equivalent scores. Id. In addition, one study
found “that sixty percent of disabled workers remained with their job placement as
opposed to only forty percent of able-bodied workers, and that the average cost of
each job turnover was $2,800.” See id. at 325 (citing Peter D. Blanck, The Emerging
Role of the Staffing Industry in the Employment of Persons with Disabilities: A Case Report on
Manpower Inc. 7 (Annenberg Washington Program Publication, 1998)).
389. See Patricia Digh, People with Disabilities Show What They Can Do, HR MAG., June
1998, at 141, 144 (citing Rutgers economist Douglas Kruse). The article estimates
that employing one million individuals with disabilities would lead to a “$21.2 billion
annual increase in earned income; a $1.2 billion dollar decrease in means-tested
income payments; a $286 million annual decrease in the use of food stamps; a $1.8
billion dollar decrease in Supplementary Security Income payments; 284,000 fewer
people using Medicaid and 166,000 fewer people using Medicare.”
390. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2000).
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payments for some employees who work more than forty hours a
391
week. Employers must comply with the environmental and recordkeeping requirements of the Occupational and Safety and Health Act
392
(“OSHA”) to ensure a safe working environment, and for certain
medical and family reasons, must allow employees to take unpaid
393
leave under the FMLA.
One scholar argues that other federal anti-discrimination laws also
394
impose significant costs upon employers.
For example, Title VII
prohibits employers from refusing to hire a member of a protected
class because of customer or coworker attitudes about the group in
395
question. An employer who must hire a woman or a member of an
ethnic minority in order to comply with Title VII, even though
customers or other employees will feel uncomfortable working with
the individual, may suffer financial loss in the form of lost income
from sales to customers who go elsewhere or reduced productivity on
396
the part of distressed employees.
Likewise, Title VII prohibits an
employer from utilizing a facially neutral employment practice that
has a disparate impact on members of a protected class unless the
employer can demonstrate that the practice is job-related and
397
consistent with business necessity.
Employers who must forego
their chosen application processes or abandon other favored job
criteria in order to comply with Title VII absorb the cost of
398
substituting other practices that they deem less desirable.
Finally, the ADA is quite balanced in that it provides employers
with several powerful defenses. The ADA protects only qualified
399
individuals with disabilities. Employers are not required to consider
391. Id. § 207(a)(1).
392. Id. § 654(a)(2); see id. § 654(a)(1) (mandating that each covered employer
must keep its workplace “free from recognized hazards . . . causing or . . . likely to
cause death or serious physical harm to [its] employees”); id. § 657(c) (requiring the
maintenance of accurate records and the filing of periodic reports concerning
workplace injuries).
393. Id. §§ 2601-2554.
394. Jolls, supra note 119 (discussing the financial costs associated with employing
a disfavored group of employees under different anti-discrimination laws).
395. See Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981)
(holding that employers cannot refuse to hire a female applicant because of
customer preference for contact with a male employee).
396. Jolls, supra note 119, at 35.
397. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2000); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 429-33 (1971) (holding that employers could not use possession of a high
school diploma and scores on general intelligence tests as requirements for
successful applicants because these criteria disproportionately eliminated black
candidates and were not clearly related to job performance).
398. See Jolls, supra note 119, at 8-20 (illustrating that the anti-discrimination laws’
prohibition of practices with a disparate impact can translate into accommodation
requirements).
399. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
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individuals with disabilities who do not have the requisite education
and experience for the job and need not retain those who have
400
demonstrated incompetence or performance problems. Employers
are obligated to provide only accommodations that are “reasonable”
and are free to refuse to undertake accommodations that will pose an
401
“undue hardship” on the operation of their businesses.
The ADA
402
also provides employers with a “direct threat” defense.
Employers
are not required to hire or retain qualified individuals with
disabilities who pose risks to the health or safety of themselves or
403
others in the workplace. These defenses significantly diminish the
liability exposure of employers and limit the dollars that they are
likely to spend for purposes of ADA compliance.
400. See The Economics of the Employment Provisions, supra note 377, at 888
(explaining that Title I requires employers to consider one’s skills independent of
the disability, but employers have the right to “determine legitimate essential job
functions or production requirements”).
401. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). The ADA provides the following details
concerning the reasonable accommodation requirement:
Factors to be considered. In determining whether an accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered
include—
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this Act;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in
the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons
employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the
impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the
facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size
of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its
employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including
the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such
entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship
of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.
Id. § 12111(10)(B).
Like the definition of “disability,” this standard suffers from vagueness because it
provides no guidance as to how the four factors are to be balanced or prioritized.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the courts have found many requested accommodations to
be unreasonable. In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 418-20 (2002), for
example, the Supreme Court ruled that an employer ordinarily does not have to
provide an accommodation that conflicts with the rules of an established seniority
system.
402. 45 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000).
403. Id. The plain text of the statute allows for the direct threat defense only in
cases where an employee with a disability would pose a risk to “other individuals in the
workplace.” Id. (emphasis added). In 2002, however, the Supreme Court, relying
on an EEOC regulation, held that employers may also refuse to hire individuals
whose own health would be endangered if they perform the job duties in question.
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 84-87 (2002). EEOC regulations
provide the following guidance: in determining whether an individual would pose a
direct threat, the factors to be considered include: “1) The duration of the risk;
2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; 3) The likelihood that the
potential harm will occur; and 4) The imminence of the potential harm.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(r) (2002).
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Further studies should be conducted to determine the full extent
of the costs and benefits of Title I of the ADA, including expenses
associated with hiring, retention, and accommodation of disabled
404
workers, administrative compliance, and litigation.
However,
neither the empirical evidence gathered to date nor a plain reading
of the statutory text justifies deep anxiety about exorbitant expenses
absorbed by the business community and not currently addressed
through tax relief measures.
4.

The definition of disability should not be retained and elucidated
through extensive impairment-based lists or formulas
A different alternative for revising the ADA is to retain the current
definition of disability but to elucidate it by creating an extensive
impairment-based list or a formula to describe those encompassed
within the protected class. Detailed specification would provide
clearer guidance to the courts, to plaintiffs who must evaluate the
viability of their claims, and to employers who must comply with the
statutory obligations.
There are at least two ways in which the definition could be
reformulated to achieve greater specificity. First, the definition could
be retained but supplemented by a list of conditions that are covered
by the ADA. During congressional debates, legislators considered
specifying the conditions to be covered by the ADA and actually
405
The National Federation of
created a list of disorders.
Independent Business favored the creation of a list so that employers
would have precise guidance as to which conditions must be
accommodated, and it estimated that 900 types of disabilities would
406
be included.
Theoretically, at least, a list would provide definitive
guidance to employers and the courts, eliminating the need for
extensive litigation concerning the question of whether or not the
plaintiff has a disability.
404. The Economics of The Employment Provisions, supra note 377, at 906-08 (urging
that additional studies be conducted to examine the direct and indirect costs and
benefits of Title I implementation, compliance and related litigation in order to
accurately assess its economic impact).
405. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28
(listing a number of conditions that would be covered including orthopedic, visual,
speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy,
multiple sclerosis, HIV/AIDS, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation,
emotional illness, specific learning disabilities, and drug and alcohol addiction).
406. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 2273 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong.
89-90 (1989) (statement of John J. Motley III, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.); see also 136
CONG. REC. H-2599-01, 2621 (1990) (statement of Rep. McCollum) (estimating that
approximately 900 disabilities could be covered by the ADA).
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Use of a list to define the protected class would not be an
unprecedented practice. In the field of employment law, lists are
already utilized in several contexts. Workers’ compensation laws in
407
this country rely on lists of impairments.
These laws, which vary
from state to state, provide for coverage of medical costs and a
percentage of lost earnings for employees whose injuries or illnesses
408
occur within the course and scope of employment.
Benefits are
scheduled and listed by the extent of injury. For example, benefits
are awarded for a varying number of weeks for loss of an arm, hand,
thumb, first finger, second finger, third finger, fourth finger, leg,
foot, great toe, other toes, one eye, hearing in one ear, and hearing
409
in both ears.
The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) has also created a list of
impairments for purposes of administering claims for Social Security
410
Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits. The listing of impairments,
411
which is periodically amended and updated, spans eighty-five pages
in the Code of Federal Regulations, and includes numerous
categories, such as the musculoskeletal, respiratory, cardiovascular,
digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, endocrine, multiple
body, and immune systems; special senses and speech; neurological;
412
skin; mental disorders; neoplastic diseases and malignancies.
In
part, the SSA asks each benefits applicant whether her impairment is
413
identical or equal to an impairment on the list. However, fulfilling
this criterion accounts for only sixty percent of all awards. Those who
do not have a listed condition may prove that they, nevertheless, are
unable to “perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
414
national economy.”
Allowing applicants who do not have a listed
condition to receive benefits if they can prove that their ailments are
407. See ARTHUR LAWSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 62.10 (1984)
(illustrating the variation of benefits available depending on the type of
impairment).
408. See id. § 1.10 (noting that an employee is automatically entitled to benefits if
injured in the course of employment).
409. See id. § 52.10 (providing a chart of disabilities and corresponding benefits).
410. See Social Security Administration, 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, App. 1
(providing list of impairments); see also Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S.
795, 804 (1999) (describing the Administration’s handling of disability claims); see
generally 46 AM. JUR. 2D Extent of Disability under Social Security Act § 7 (2002) (exploring
the process used to determine whether to grant social security benefits to an
allegedly disabled individual).
411. 20 C.F.R. § 404(p), App. 1 (2002).
412. Id.
413. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525, 404.1526 (2001) (discussing the listing of
impairments’ purpose and use as well as the concept of “medical equivalence”); see
Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 804 (noting that one step in the SSA’s analysis is determining
whether the applicant has an impairment included on the list).
414. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 804; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 404.1560(c) (2001).
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“equivalent” to a listed impairment further complicates the process
415
and reduces its efficiency. Finally, in Cleveland v. Policy Management
416
Systems Corp., the Supreme Court recognized that the SSA’s list
would be inappropriate for ADA purposes because it over-simplifies
many complicated conditions, failing to take into account individual
differences that might render people able to perform specific jobs
417
with or without reasonable accommodations.
Thus, a different,
more nuanced list would thus be necessary for ADA determinations.
Mark Rothstein and his colleagues propose the creation of such a
418
list in a recently published article. They suggest that the definition
of “disability” be left intact, but that Congress should direct the
EEOC “to publish medical standards for determining disability for
the most common physical and mental impairments” so that “[a]n
individual whose medical condition met the published criteria would
419
The authors
be presumptively covered under the ADA.”
themselves, however, recognize the complexities and limitations of
their proposal. They acknowledge that no list can be exclusive and
420
include all medical conditions.
Furthermore, impairments affect
various individuals to different degrees, and consequently, an
individualized assessment of the degree of impairment would still be
421
necessary.
A further obstacle arises from the fact that a moderate
condition can become substantially limiting if it coexists with another
422
moderate condition.
Consequently, individuals whose conditions
do not meet the published criteria would not be barred from
bringing suit. Rather, they would have to rebut the presumption of
non-coverage by providing clear and convincing evidence that their
423
impairments substantially limit a major life activity.
Creating an exhaustive list of physical and mental conditions to be
424
covered by the ADA would, in fact, be nearly impossible.
No list
that attempts to capture all disabling conditions could be fully
415. See Floyd Skloot, A Measure of Acceptance, 19 CREATIVE NONFICTION 79, 79-91
(2002) (describing the lengthy and demeaning process of testing that the mentally
disabled author was required to undergo when the Social Security Administration
decided to re-evaluate his disability status eight years after its initial determination in
his case).
416. 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
417. Id. at 803-04.
418. Rothstein, supra note 287, at 270-72.
419. Id. at 270-71.
420. Id. at 271.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 27 (1990) (asserting that such a list would
not ensure comprehensiveness, particularly because new disorders could develop in
the future).
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accurate and comprehensive. The objections identified by Professor
425
In addition, medical science
Rothstein are all appropriate.
perpetually achieves advances in disease identification and treatment,
so that one’s disability status associated with particular conditions
might change over time.
While creation of a non-exclusive list of covered conditions will
partially fill the vacuum of guidance that now exists, it is unlikely to
dramatically reduce litigation concerning the question of what
constitutes a disability. Individuals with conditions that are not
specifically listed would bring suit claiming that their impairments
are, nonetheless, substantially limiting and, thus, covered under the
ADA. The courts would then be required to make those disability
determinations. The proposal, therefore, would not eliminate the
problems of inconsistent court decisions, invasive scrutiny of private
activities, and the Catch-22 related to proving that an individual is
426
both substantially limited and still qualified for the job in question.
It is for these reasons that the recommendations outlined in this
Article offer a superior alternative. An exclusive list of impairments
and impairment categories, based not on the extent to which they
affect daily living, but on evidence of systematic discrimination
against those with the covered conditions, would address the
concerns described above and provide much clearer guidance to
427
litigants and the courts.
A second approach is one that has been adopted by some
428
European countries.
These countries provide special benefits and
rights to individuals who have a specific degree of disability. In
Germany, for example, the determination of disability status is made
by an independent welfare institution, and the “severely disabled” are
429
defined as those with at least a fifty percent degree of disability. In
the Netherlands, there are seven categories of disability, determined

425. See supra notes 420-23 and accompanying text (noting the problems with the
author’s own suggestion to create a list of disabilities to be covered by the ADA).
426. See discussion supra Part I.C.2 (exploring problems raised by the
individualized assessment approach).
427. See discussion supra Part III.A (arguing that the ADA should be amended to
redefine individuals with disabilities as those with mental or physical impairments
that have been subjected to a pattern of discrimination and by creating specific
categories of covered impairments).
428. Patricia Thornton & Neil Lunt, Employment Policies for Disabled People in
Eighteen Countries:
A Review, University of York Printing Unit, available at
http://gladnet.org/infobase/employment/Policies/emp_policies_18_countries.htm
(describing the disability laws of various countries) (on file with the American
University Law Review).
429. Id.
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430

by the extent to which one’s earning capacity is diminished.
The
431
categories range from fifteen to one-hundred percent.
Like an exhaustive list of disabilities, agency determinations of
disability status based on a required percentage of limitation could
theoretically provide clear guidance to the courts and diminish the
volume of frivolous ADA litigation. So long as an individual obtained
the necessary documentation proving that the disability was of a
requisite degree, the courts would be bound to deem the individual
disabled. The courts would be spared the task of grappling with the
question of who is disabled and would not be faced with trivial cases
brought by plaintiffs who have minor impairments.
Nevertheless, associating disability status with a percentage of
incapacity would not be an ideal approach in the United States.
Determining the precise percentage of disability that would count for
ADA purposes would be a political nightmare for policy makers
facing conflicting and passionate demands from a variety of interest
groups. It is likely that there would be great resistance to the
establishment of a single, inflexible bright-line to demarcate who is
included within the protected class, excluding from protected status
all who fall even slightly below the required percentage point. No
matter what figure is chosen, it would be viewed as arbitrary and
unjust by many opponents. Furthermore, once the standard is
determined, a costly bureaucracy would have to be established to
conduct medical examinations or review medical records for each
claimant in order to ascertain whether the requisite percentage of
disability exists.
While it may seem as though the process of determining each
person’s degree of limitation would be exact and scientific, it is
unlikely to be so, especially with respect to mental disabilities.
Procedures for testing and evaluation could be lengthy and
432
controversial, causing delays in the resolution of cases.
Furthermore, it is probable that disability determinations would be
frequently challenged as inaccurate, biased, or unreliable and,
therefore, would spawn significant litigation. Consequently, adopting
a percentage-based disability definition is unlikely to be an efficient,
just, and greatly improved mechanism for determining who is an
individual with a disability.

430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Skloot, supra note 415, at 79-91.
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CONCLUSION
The introductory “Findings and Purposes” section of the ADA
asserts that the statute aims to present an unambiguous and
comprehensive national directive for the eradication “of
433
discrimination against individuals with disabilities” and thus to
promote corrective justice. More specifically, the statute’s aim is to
provide its protected class with an equal opportunity to fully
participate in society, live independently, and become economically
434
self-sufficient because individuals with disabilities have faced a
history of intentional discrimination and have been “relegated to a
435
position of political powerlessness in our society.” At this time it is
very difficult to assess the efficacy of Title I of the ADA conclusively in
436
light of the dearth of available empirical information. The limited
evidence that exists, however, suggests that these objectives are not
437
being adequately fulfilled.
Moreover, a plain reading of the
statutory text reveals that the definitional language of the ADA is
438
severely flawed and requires amendment.
It is arguable that no change in the ADA’s definition of disability
will enhance the law’s efficacy. As some have noted, in “the current
political climate . . . there is great dissatisfaction with civil rights laws
439
in general.”
Recently, the Supreme Court has eroded the relief
available to ADA plaintiffs in decisions concerning reasonable
440
441
accommodations, the direct threat defense, the ability of plaintiffs
442
443
to sue state employers, and the availability of punitive damages.
433. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1995).
434. Id. § 12101(a)(8).
435. Id. § 12101(a)(7).
436. See discussion supra Part II (noting the limited availability of empirical
evidence and the inconclusiveness of much of that data).
437. See discussion supra Part II (discussing evidence concerning employment
rates of individuals with disabilities and relief obtained by victims of discrimination).
438. See discussion supra Part I (analyzing the ambiguity the definition of
“disability”).
439. Tucker, supra note 186, at 373; see Michael Selmi, Why are Employment
Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 555 (2001) (discussing
judicial hostility towards plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases).
440. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (holding that if an
employer proves that a desired accommodation conflicts with an established seniority
system, the employer is not required to provide the accommodation unless special
circumstances exist).
441. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (ruling that
employers are authorized to refuse to hire an individual whose own health would be
endangered by performance of job duties even if no direct threat is posed to anyone
else in the workplace).
442. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding
that private parties could not sue state employers for money damages under the ADA
because of Eleventh Amendment immunity).
443. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) (finding that punitive damages may
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Similarly, the Supreme Court has issued several opinions that have
limited the right of action available to employment discrimination
444
plaintiffs in areas other than the ADA. It is possible, consequently,
that even if Congress amended the statute, the courts would continue
to narrow the scope of ADA protection regardless of any changes in
the statutory definition.
Nevertheless, amending the disability definition and establishing
an exclusive list of covered impairments and condition categories
associated with systematic discrimination would offer both fidelity to
the statutory goal of corrective justice and workability as a legal
instrument. It would promote inclusion of those who have been
traditionally excluded and redistribution of resources to the most
needy and deserving. It would provide more lucid guidance to
plaintiffs who must decide whether they have viable discrimination
claims, to employers who wish to avoid violations of the law and
potential litigation, and to the courts. The new definition of
disability would replace subjective assessment of the plaintiff’s
functionality level with a much more concrete and accessible proof
mechanism.
As Congress explicitly recognized, strong judicial enforcement of
the rights of those who are otherwise marginalized would also benefit
445
the American economy. The statute’s Findings section decries the
spending of “billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting
446
If individuals with
from dependency and nonproductivity.”
disabilities who have traditionally been excluded from the workplace
knew they had strong advocates in the courts and could obtain
meaningful relief if they faced discrimination, more might attempt to
447
enter and remain in the workforce. At the same time, if employers
not be awarded in private suits brought against public entities under section 202 of
the ADA).
444. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (ruling that the ADEA
did not abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity and, therefore, private
parties could not bring ADEA suits against state employers); see also Circuit City v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that mandatory arbitration policies unilaterally
imposed by employers on employees could be enforced under the Federal
Arbitration Act, with the very narrow exception of policies that applied to
transportation workers).
Under Circuit City, those whose employers have
implemented mandatory arbitration policies cannot bring their employment
discrimination cases to federal court even if they were given no meaningful choice
concerning acceptance of the policy. Id.
445. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (1995).
446. Id.
447. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 16-17 (1989) (noting that “discrimination results in
dependency on social welfare programs that costs the taxpayers unnecessary billions
of dollars each year”); 135 CONG. REC. S10713 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of
Sen. Harkin) (stating that President Bush estimates that national spending on
disability benefits and programs equals sixty billion dollars, money that will be saved
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did not incur costs associated with disputes involving the many
people whose impairments would not be listed as disabilities, they
might be more willing to invest voluntarily in integrating individuals
with disabilities into the workforce. It is only with a better conception
of who constitutes an individual with a disability that the ADA will
fulfill its mission of providing “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
448
standards” and meaningful legal remedies for those subjected to
disability discrimination.

once the disabled are employed and become taxpayers and consumers).
448. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (1995).

